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DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES





The dramatic growth of environmental regulation has been one of the
important recent developments in modem law.' And of those most affected
by this impressive growth, the business community ranks at or near the top
of the list. In fact, this expanding environmental regulatory sphere is now
a constant and imposing presence in the economic, managerial and political
lives of many businesses.
2
The discussion in this article derives from a provocative new phenom-
enon affecting those businesses, and lying at the juncture of environmental
protection, economics, and corporate finance: the dynamic created by the
legal duty of publicly held companies to disclose environmental liabilities
and obligations to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission), to their securityholders, and to the securities markets.
Environmental regulation has become increasingly more substantial and
more stringent. Significantly, these estimable new laws are spilling over into
other regulatory schemes with the same force that has accompanied their
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University; B. Engr.,
Vanderbilt University, 1970; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1975. The preparation
of this Article was supported by a generous grant from the Washington College of Law, for
which I express my appreciation. I wish to thank Steve Masur for his research assistance and
Professor Andrew Pike for his valuable observations and commentary on the article.
1. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGuLATIoN; LAW, SCIENCE, AND
PoLcY 1 (1992). The following statement well summarizes the growth of environmental
regulation:
The spectacular growth of public concern for the environment has transformed
American law during the past quarter-century. In the space of a single generation,
environmental law has grown from a sparse set of common law precedents and local
ordinances to encompass a vast body of national legislation. Numerous federal and
state agencies now implement these laws through breathtakingly complex regulations
that affect virtually every aspect of our lives. In addition, as environmental concerns
increasingly transcend national boundaries, environmental law is now serving as a
catalyst for the development of new regimes of international law.
2. See Richard Y. Roberts, Overview of Environmental Disclosure, Remarks at Prentice
Hall Law & Business Thirteenth Annual Institute on Proxy Statements, Annual Meetings &
Disclosure Documents I (Dec. 16, 1991) (transcript on file with author); see also Lawrence B.
Cafiifl, Issues in Environmental Auditing, PEmoatrOUM INDEPENDENT, Nov. 1992, at A2:
As environmental rules become more complex and enforcement penalties increase,
companies are simultaneously having to "do more with less" due to economic
pressures. Is there relief in sight? Probably not.
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invasion of the corporate boardroom. Indeed, viewing modem environmen-
tal law through the prism of the disclosure-oriented federal securities reg-
ulatory system not only reveals the awesome potential reach of the present
environmental regulatory system, but also illuminates the huge challenge
for businesses to achieve overall legal compliance while competing effectively
in the increasingly global markets for products and capital.
A. The Impact of Modern Environmental Regulation on
the Business Community
The "command and control" paradigm emerged during the 1970s and
1980s as the modus operandi of modern American environmental regulation.'
In this mode of regulation, a governmental body sets "performance" or
"prescriptive" standards for pollution reduction or limitation and then
monitors, investigates, and when necessary, enforces compliance by those
discharging pollutants into the environment. 4 Further, while one finds grow-
ing sentiment for newer methods, such as market-based! ones, and corre-
spondingly, increasing criticism of command and control,' the latter method
3. Percival describes the command and control paradigm in this lway:
Under the command-and-control approach, government authorities issue specific
pollution control commands to regulated firms and then monitor the firms to ensure
that the commands are followed. In its original design, the Clean Air Act of 1970
epitomized this approach to regulation, and the overall structure of the Act is still
dominated by it.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 796.
It should be noted that alternative systems to the classic command and control approach
of modern environmental legislation are significant matters of current discussion and debate.
Further, certain alternatives, including economic incentive-based ones, are now being put into
effect at the federal and state levels. See, e.g., DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER,
ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCEs AND THE ENVIRONMENT 70-119 (1990); Robert W. Hahn
& Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era From an Old
Idea?, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); James Dao, Some Regions fear the Price as Pollution Rights
are Sold, N.Y. TIms, Feb. 6, 1993, at Al.
For a particularly interesting and well received discussion of new, progressive environ-
mental protection approaches, including that of "sustainable development," see STFPrAN
SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING CouRsE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND Tm ENI-
RONMENT (1992). Schmidheiny also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the command
and control concept. Id. at 19-20.
4. See ScHmDHEan,, supra note 3, at 19:
Traditionally, governments have used command-and-control regulations to achieve
environmental objectives. "Performance" standards set a target-often for emis-
sions-and allow companies flexibility in meeting it; "prescriptive standards" may
prescribe the actual technology to be used, assuming that it will achieve the desired
result. The former allow companies more scope for innovation and efficiency.
5. Many believe that the often ominous and ever costly command and control schemes
of American environmental law have not produced nearly the levels of benefit commensurate
with associated costs and burdens on business decisionmaking and operations:
The Superfund programme has not been a success. Although it has been running
for 13 years, few sites have so far been cleaned up to the [Environmental Protection
Agency's] satisfaction. The programme has cost the federal government over $1
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has been the vehicle for past successes and is at present the predominating
one.6
Several phenomena account for the relatively successful ascendency of
command and control environmental regulation; these phenomena also
explain why recent environmental laws affect the business community so
greatly. First, the sheer number of environmental laws at the federal, state,
and local levels is of fundamental importance. Quite apart from the other
contributing phenomena, this one alone inspires no small amount of angst
among corporate managers. For example, even the threshold identification
of applicable duties and liabilities has become an administratively burden-
some-and legally perilous-task. 7 Indeed, the virtually institutionalized use
billion a year. But enormous sums are also being spent by polluters and their
insurers, not just on cleaning up but also on legal fees, as the courts struggle to
decide who should pay what share of the bills. A study published last year by the
Rand Corporation ... found that 88% of the money spent by insurers went on
legal fees and other paperwork costs.
A Survey of Waste and the Environment, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1993, at 15 (clarification
added).
For an analytical explanation of why command and control regimes such as Superfund
have produced disappointing results, see Celia Campbell-Mohn, Objectives and Tools of
Environmental Law, in SusTAnABL E'vrmoNmmNTAL LAw 143, 172-73 (Celia Campbell-Mohn
et al. eds., 1993). The author notes that although command and control methods have the
advantage of providing clarity and an even playing field, other important disadvantages to the
method are apparent:
The primary detriment of centralized command-and-control standards is that
they are inflexible regarding fluctuations in natural systems and the economy ....
For example, [they] cannot account for the varying abilities of natural systems to
respond to pollutants. They also cannot account for fluctuations within natural
systems that increase or decrease the carrying capacity at different times in the
natural cycle.
Present command-and-control regulations are often pollutant specific, not ac-
counting for synergistic impacts among various pollutants.
Also, in many cases, [they] must rely on scientific evidence where values are
unquantifiable. For example, basing regulations on risk assessment requires quanti-
tative valuation of ethical judgments, such as the value of human life.
Finally, command-and-control regulation creates inefficiency by applying uni-
form reductions where costs of compliance vary. Present command-and-control
regimes tend to disadvantage new sources to the economic advantage of existing
sources.
Id. at 173 (clarification added).
6. Campbell-Mohn, supra note 5, at 172:
Command-and-control regulations are the nuts and bolts of environmental tools.
Virtually every environmental statute relies partially on command-and-control regu-
lation.
Some form of command-and-control regulation is unavoidable except within a
purely free market system. Because a pure free market system cannot account for
generations beyond several decades, all of the objectives of environmental law cannot
presently be achieved without some command-and-control overlay within other tools.
7. See Cahill, supra note 2, at A2:
Regulatory agencies, the public and shareholders continue to expect companies to
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of the "environmental audit" evolved largely in response lto the problems
of administration posed by this dizzying maze of compliance requirements.8
Second, these numerous laws are increasingly ambitious, both in the strin-
gency of the duties imposed and in the magnitude of the penalties assessed
for noncompliance. Third, in order to give maximum effect to these more
substantial duties and penalties, tougher, more persistent! policies toward
environmental law enforcement exist. Finally, and critically, this great
breadth and intensity of regulation disproportionately affects the business
community. 9 Perhaps this is true in part because of businesses' "deep
pockets," which make available large sums to clean up the environment.
Principally, however, the business community's disproportionate contribu-
tions to environmental degradation are the basis of its correspondingly
disproportionate liabilities and obligations.'0
institute programs to assure that "due diligence" requirements of federal legislation
are met (e.g., Section 107(b)(3) of the 1986 Superfund Amendments). Indeed, one
wonders if fail-safe compliance management is possible.
(emphasis added). See "also ENVIRONMENTAL AuDrrs I-1 (L. Cahill & R. Kane eds., 6th ed.
1989) ("Managing compliance in today's regulatory setting has become an almost overwhelming
exercise, involving more and more regulations, and affecting more and more organizations.");
Barry Breen, Environmental Law From Resource to Recovery, in SuSTAN IABr ENvmoRNMETrAL
LAW, supra note 5, at 65, 66:
While environmental law's bulk is scary, its complexity is entangling. Too much
detail is held together by too few principles. Environmental law tempts you to learn
it by mastering a mass of detail: what standards apply, under what laws, under
what circumstances[?] When do you need a permit, and from whom, and how do
you get it? Who is liable for what costs, but what are the exceptions?
Unfortunately, trying to "know" environmental law may be impossible. There
is too much of it.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See Cahill, supra note 2, at A2:
Within this context [of more complex, ambitious environmental regulation], many
companies have instituted environmental audit programs. Audit programs can be
very valuable management tools, achieving a number of strategic objectives, includ-
ing: [I] Defining compliance status for plant managers [2] Providing compliance
assurance for senior management [3] Increasing environmental awareness throughout
an organization [4] Reducing the number and amount of fines and enforcement
actions [5] Enhancing the credibility of the company with investors and the local
community.
See generally ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS, supra note 7.
9. See A Survey of Waste and the Environment, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added):
Environmentalists ... sometimes seem more concerned to punish those whose
products end up on rubbish heaps than to encourage sensible behavior.
[Governments, succumbing to such pressures] have sometimes adopted policies whose
costs are wildly out of line with their benefits ... This happens because the costs
of such legislation are usually carried, in the first instance, by companies. They are
therefore hidden from the voters who demand them.
10. See Ross H. Fishman et al., Environmental Reporting Required By The Securities
And Exchange Commission, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1065 (Aug. 16, 1991). Practitioners
describe the phenomenon in this way:
Environmental compliance costs are dramatically increasing as a component of
our economy. In a recently released report to Congress, the Environmental Protection
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Although all of the phenomena discussed above are important, one can
fairly state that command and control environmental regulation is only as
successful as its enforcement component. Accordingly, and as a reflection
of the growth of modem environmental regulation itself, "[environmental
enforcement has grown dramatically over the last decade. The 1980s ushered
in an era of increased environmental regulation which will continue into
the 1990s and will raise numerous issues of concern to the regulated
community."" Not always, but more often than not, the term "regulated
community" translates into "business community."
Recent enhancements to environmental enforcement capacity include
critical increases in authority and resources for administrative as well as
civil enforcement. Additionally, and riding the crest of a growing wave of
public support for environmental protection, criminal prosecution of envi-
ronmental violations has assumed a prominent position in the array of
means now available to state and federal regulators:
During the 1980s, the criminal provisions of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the Clean Water Act,
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") were expanded and strengthened. In
1990, felony provisions were finally added to the Clean Air Act. 12
Present trends could well continue into the 1990s, not only because of
enhanced statutory authority, but also because of other increases in govern-
mental resources. These resources include: computerization of information
and data; increased enforcement activity by United States Attorneys, state
attorney generals, and local district attorneys, complementing the work of
the federal Department of Justice (historically the major enforcement agency
Agency projected that by the year 2000, costs for pollution control activities will
total 2.6 percent of gross national product. In comparison, expenditures during 1972
totaled 0.9 percent of GNP and 1990 expenditures totaled 2.1 percent of GNP.
While these numbers appear significant as averages, it is also important to realize
that the costs are not spread evenly over all industries; some industries are already,
and will continue to be, confronted with costs far higher than reflected in the
averages.
Id. (citations omitted); Roberts, supra note 2, at 2-4 (commenting on magnitude of potential
liabilities to businesses from violations of environmental laws).
Implicit in the authors' comments and data is the assumption that these compliance costs
are visited overwhelmingly upon the business community. The authors expressly note the
concentration of costs within particular industries. Fishman et al., supra,, at 1067-69. Com-
missioner Roberts also notes that "[w]hile both federal and state environmental laws have
permeated the consciousness of many businesses, particular industries, such as the pharmaceu-
tical, petroleum, chemical, waste management, and heavy manufacturing segments, among
others, must be particularly sensitive to disclosure and accounting issues ...." Roberts, supra
note 2, at 2. The increased attention necessary for securities regulatory issues is but a reflection
of the extent to which these industries contribute to overall environmental pollution problems.
11. Thomas J. Kelley & Nancy Voisin, Enforcement Trends, in FEDERAL ENvIRONMENTAL
LAw: ANNuAL REPORT 1 (1992).
12. Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
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for court-related matters); and the enactment of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987.1s
The essential message of these developments is clear: Environmental
liability has become more definite, more substantial, and more than likely
subject to enforcement.' 4 Therefore, while one frequently encounters signif-
icant criticisms of the present system among both proponents and opponents
of environmental protection,' 5 the cumulative effect of current trends in
environmental regulation is also clear: They have injected substantial and
complex new elements into the calculus of organizational decisionmaking
by those subject to such regulation.' 6
Against this background-indeed, because of it-the duty to disclose
environmental liabilities and other obligations under the securities laws has
become, to a degree, a functional extension of the environmental regulatory
system. Similarly, that duty has also become an integral part of the complex
decisionmaking process of modern publicly held businesses. 7
B. SEC Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities
Within the past twenty years, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission"5 has become both more particular and more insistent about the
need for disclosure of environmental liabilities and obligations by companies
13. Id. at 2-10.
14. See Barnaby J. Feder, New Battles Over Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at
CIO (discussing problems and challenges facing industry in face of increased environmental
compliance duties and concurrently increased focus on securities law disclosure on environ-
mental liabilities and obligations).
15. For a rather nonpartisan description of the failings of the present environmental law
regime, see Introduction, in SusAiNABLE ENvIRoNmmNTAL LAW, supra note 5, at VII:
Despite ever-growing public and private expenditures to implement environmental
law, surprisingly few actual improvements occur. Often, spending large sums of
money has only kept problems from worsening. Meanwhile, the gap between envi-
ronmental quality and the objectives of environmental law widens. Congress responds
to environmental problems by adding more administrative law fixes, creating an
acropolis of administrative structures. Still, the administrative capacity to resolve
environmental problems diminishes. Eventually administrative institutions become
overwhelmed by the piecemeal approach.
16. Accordingly, the debate continues regarding whether this more difficult calculus (no
small part of which includes economic considerations) is a justifiable price for securing
improvements in environmental compliance and environmental quality.
17. See Mary B. Sammons, Firms Pushed to Reveal Compliance Costs; Agencies and
New Laws Force Public Disclosure, CRiui's Cm. Bus., Nov. 9, 1992, at T3:
The financial costs of environmental compliance have long been treated as a
company secret.
But recent legislation, coupled with a government crackdown on companies slow
to comply with existing disclosure laws, is making more of that information public,
forcing executives to pay closer attention to its effects on a company's bottom line.
18. For a description of the organization and functions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), see OFFIcE OF PUaLIc Asubras U.S. SEcuaMs AND EXCHANGE ComIssoN,
Tan WORK OF Tm SEC (1986).
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regulated under the federal securities laws.' 9 The nexus between the securities
law disclosure concept and environmental regulatory requirements and trends
has been described by SEC Commissioner Richard Y. Roberts:
As society strives to maintain and to improve our environment,
costs are imposed that may need to be disclosed to investors under
our federal securities laws. Compliance costs associated with regula-
tions restricting development and limiting harmful emissions can have
a material effect on the operating expenses of a company. Moreover,
environmental laws can impose large liabilities, particularly with
respect to past generators of waste materials.
The potential for large losses attributable to environmental prob-
lems is an important concern that many investors will factor into
their investment decision ... Indeed, vigorous enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws likely to occur in the decade to come have made
environmental liability a matter of growing prominence for lenders,
rating agencies, and acquisition-minded companies, among othersY'
Commissioner Roberts' remarks regarding securities law disclosure of envi-
ronmental liabilities aptly state the rationale for the SEC's increased regulatory
emphasis on this area. So substantial has been this interest by the SEC that
it has begun cooperative discussions and activities with the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the major-although not the exclu-
sive-federal environmental regulatory agency. 2' On an informal basis, for
example, SEC staffmembers receive from the EPA lists of all companies that
19. Elizabeth A.G. GeItman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public
Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 124, 130 (1992). Ms.
Geltman also states:
The federal securities laws consist of six separate statutes, enacted between 1933
and 1940, and the corresponding implementing regulations. Congress designed the
Securities Act of 1933 ... and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... "to protect
investors against fraud and manipulation of stock prices."
The federal securities laws generally substitute "a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor." The Securities. Exchange Commission adopted
this spirit in Rule lOb-5, which makes it unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to use interstate commerce to defraud another person in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security .... In addition, Regulation S-K expressly requires
all publicly held companies to make certain disclosures concerning, inter alia,
contingent environmental liabilities arising under federal, state, or local laws. These
disclosures must be included in the appropriate public documents filed by public
companies with the SEC.
Id. at 129-30 (footnotes omitted).
20. See Richard Y. Roberts, Developments Concerning Environmental Disclosure, Re-
marks Before the Dallas Bar Association 1-6 (May 28, 1992) (transcript on file with author)
(emphasis added).
21. See AARON GERSHONOWTrZ, How Tm EgvmoNIomENAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY
SYsnmA WoRKs: A Busnumss PumRm 51-61 (1991).
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have been named Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA). 22 Also, the EPA provides the SEC with information concerning
companies subject to the cleanup requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.2
Other types of information provided to the SEC staff include informationI
about criminal cases under federal environmental laws, civil proceedings under
environmental laws, and companies barred from government contracts under
the Clean Air Act24 and the Clean Water Act.2? The staff currently utilizes
this information in its disclosure review processes. Finally,! the SEC is con-
sidering whether it will formalize this dialogue through the execution of a
memorandum of understanding with the EPA.26
The confluence of enhanced environmental enforcement and increased
SEC emphasis on environmental disclosure makes available immense amounts
of information and data to those for whom the quality of companies'
environmental compliance records and policies is crucial. z7 And, as one court
has noted, the numbers of such investors are substantial:
The importance of Plaintiffs' claims [that the SEC should promulgate
rules requiring extensive disclosure of environmental law-related mat-
ters by regulated companies] is underscored by a large number of
"ethical investors" in this country-individuals and institutions such
as our great universities and foundations which have large funds to
invest and need the information that Plaintiffs seek in order to make
investment and voting decisions in accordance with their high prin-
ciples and societal interests.?
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act is a stringent law affecting environmental ipollution by persons
generating, transporting, owning, or operating a site containing certain hazardous materials.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is a
"cradle-to-grave" system for safe handling of hazardous wastes. See, e.g., CouNcIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1982: 13TH ANNUAL REPORT 117-29 (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. III 1991).
25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
26. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 16.
27. See John Holusha, Environmentalists Assess Corporate Pollution Records, N.Y.
TIMms, Dec. 9, 1991, at DI. Commenting on the vast amount of critical information publicly
available as a result of regulatory disclosure requirements, the article refers to a current project
of the Council on Economic Priorities:
The council's reports are part of a growing effort by public interest and
environmental groups to examine and publish analyses of the vast amounts of
environmental data that the Government has required companies to file in recent
years. Early next year, the Investor Responsibility Research Center, a Washington-
based organization that conducts investment research for university endowments and
pension funds, will publish statistical summaries of the environmental performance
of all 500 companies in the Standard & Poor's index.
Id.
28. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693 (D.D.C.
1974) (citing J. SIMON ET AL., Ta ETmCAL INVEsTOR: UNrvERsrTEs ANd CORPORATE REsPoN-
siBmITms (1972)) (explanation added).
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Further, "ethical" investors are not the only investors interested in the scope
and nature of SEC environmental disclosure rules. To the extent that envi-
ronmental liabilities and obligations will have a material impact on a com-
pany's financial condition and prospects-and may thereby affect the value
of that company's securities-traditional or "economic" investors will insist
upon full and fair disclosure of such liabilities and obligations.29
The emergence of securityholder interest in environmental disclosure has
created a lever of sorts-a potent one, replete with opportunities to promote
environmental protection of a type usually discussed under the rubric of
"economic" or "market-based" incentives.30 That is, the existence of stringent
securities law duties to disclose aggressively-applied environmental liabilities
and obligations provides a predicate for investor strategies to create market
incentives favoring environmental compliance by companies whose securities
are publicly traded.3'
This article will outline several important areas of SEC environmental
disclosure, commenting on the particularly difficult compliance challenges
facing public companies and also identifying areas that have shown potential
29. See B. Feder, New Battles Over Disclosure, N.Y. TimS, June 24, 1990, at 10:
William Steiner of Great Neck, L.I., and Morton Levine of Brooklyn get angry
when a company withholds information they believe they have a right to know.
What sets them apart is that they may be at the vanguard of a new class of
courtroom confrontation: shareholders claiming to have been financially damaged
by corporations that have failed to disclose environmental problems.
Mr. Steiner claims that by not disclosing [that a building Western Capital sold
had contained asbestos, a fact that later gave rise to a $9.125 million court judgment
against the company], Western Capital managed to look profitable enough to issue
new stock and debentures in 1985 and inflated its stock price, which has fallen to
$4.75 from a peak $21.50 in 1986.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Levine v. NL Indus., 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving
litigation for environmental disclosure by shareholder against public company).
30. See Part II of this Article, which defines and discusses market-based and other
economic incentive systems that promote environmental protection.
31. See Holusha, supra note 27, at I (commenting on purpose of reports, based on SEC
required and other required public information on corporate environmental obligations, pub-
lished by Council on Economic Priorities and other public interest organizations). The article
goes on to state, "The reports are intended to appeal to socially conscious investors and to
encourage companies to minimize pollution." Id.; see also Your Money: New Trend Rising in
Socially Responsible Investments (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 6, 1993):
HIGHLIGHT: Socially-responsible funds have become the new trend in investing,
which means no tobacco, alcohol, defense and weapons contractors, gambling or
known polluters ....
STUART VARNEY, Anchor: For investors trying to bolster their earnings without
compromising their politics, shall we say, socially responsible investing may be the
path to many happy returns. A whole host of mutual funds aimed to make money
with principal portfolios. Here is Lipper Analytical's list of the best performers of
the past 12 months. Leading the pack of socially responsible funds is the Parnassus
Fund, up 29%; Pioneer III has a 12-month gain of 18.6%; MAS, the pooled select-
value fund, up 18%; Right Times Social Awareness Fund returning 16%; and the
Domini Social Index Fund shows a 14% gain.
Id. (emphasis added).
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for enhanced enforcement opportunities by the SEC and by securityholders
and others. Not the least of the categories of securityholders and others that
will be considered in this article are: (1) environmental and other public-
interest organizations; and (2) investment funds seeking to purchase the
securities of issuers having impressive-or, depending on the strategy involved,
dismal-environmental compliance records.3 2 In addition, this article explores
the prospects of market-oriented approaches for promoting environmental
law compliance.33
II. SEcTRITIs LAW PRovisIoNs REQUUNG DiscLosuRE oF Evr-moN imTAL
LIABILTIEs AND OBLIGATIONS
A. Background
SEC interest in securities law disclosure of environmental liabilities and
obligations began during the 1970s, when Congress and environmental regu-
lators started responding to public concern about environmental problems.24
The SEC's early rules emphasized disclosure of economic impacts of permit
process requirements and other environmental damage prevention, reduction
and mitigation concepts. The capital and operating costs of environmental
compliance technology, as well as the facts regarding potential and actual
32. See Mary O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 7, 11 (1992) (describing "two
distinct approaches" to "Socially Responsible Investing" (SRI)). Ms. Hylton states:
The first and simplest method of SRI is portfolio screening. The investor who
practices portfolio screening refuses to invest in an enterprise that engages in activities
that are antithetical to his or her moral beliefsl .... Portfolio screening, also referred
to as investor boycott, requires that the would-be investor identify those social,
ethical, or political issues that concern him or her and then research the activities
of potential investments to determine which investments are incompatible with his
or her views.
The second form of SRI is the activist shareholder approach, made famous by
Ralph Nader in his campaigns to improve General Motors' safety record. This
technique is distinguished by the investor's desire to change company behavior by
exercising rights that flow from ownership of the enterprise. The activist shareholder
invests in a particular firm because the firm engages in objectionable behavior, and
the shareholder hopes to change that behavior by convincing the firm that it has
ethical obligations to the wider community in which it operates.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
33. See Scmimrny, supra note 3, at 54, 68:
Capital markets will play an important role in the search for sustainable development,
but little is known about the constraints, the possibilities, and the interrelationships
between capital markets, the environment, and the needs of future generations.
Virtually no research has been done on this subject. It is essentially new territory ....
Despite the need for a great deal more research, there are many signs that capital
markets are beginning to play a much more positive role in altering the direction of
investments and of resources toward sustainable development.
34. Geltman, supra note 19, at 144.
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proceedings that could result in monetary fines based on violations of
environmental laws, were to be disclosed in an SEC-regulated company's
disclosure filings.
The first SEC release on the topic was a 1971 interpretive release entitled
Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights."
This release called for disclosure:
[I]f material, when compliance with statutory requirements with
respect to environmental quality e.g., various air, water and other
anti-pollution laws, may necessitate significant capital outlays, may
materially affect the earning power of the business, or cause material
changes in registrant's business done or intended to be done.
3 6
Additionally, the release stated that disclosure was required, "where material,
of proceedings arising, for example, under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899 .... the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ... and the Clear [sic]
Air Act... as well as under other statutes, federal, state or local, regulating
the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise specifically
relating to the protection of the environment. ' 37 More specifically, the release
provided that:
If such litigation is pending or known to be contemplated but
disclosure is omitted on the ground that it is not material, it will
be the practice of the Division of Corporation Finance to request
registrants to furnish as supplemental information and not as part
of the filing, (1) a description of the omitted information and (2)
a statement of the reasons for its omission.
38
While the 1971 release represented an important beginning in the progressive
development of SEC environmental disclosure policies, the release soon
proved inadequat6 in the face of growing public sentiment about the
importance of environmental protection. Therefore, the SEC promulgated
enhanced disclosure requirements in 1973.
In 1973, the SEC set out more expansive and demanding new environ-
mental disclosure requirements in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5386 and
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,116, Compliance with Environmen-
tal Requirements. 9 The new release required disclosure of all:
[M]aterial effects that compliance with Federal, State and local
provisions regulating the discharge of materials into the environ-
ment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment,
35. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights,
Exchange Act Release No. 9252, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507 (July 19, 1971).
36. Id. (footnote omitted).
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Compliance with Environmental Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 10,116, 3
Fed.Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507A (Apr. 20, 1973).
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may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive
position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. 40
The 1973 release also required disclosure, inter alia, of all environmental
proceedings pending or contemplated wherein a government entity was
involved.4' Forcing disclosure of all proceedings, regardless of their economic
significance or materiality, was a controversial new expansion of environ-
mental disclosure requirements. Extending the scope of disclosure far beyond
the bounds of nonenvironmental disclosure matters posed additional burdens
and risks for registrant companies. 42
Notwithstanding the SEC's advances in this area, environmental pro-
tectionists were not satisfied. Environmentalism was gaining momentum in
the United States and the voices crying out for more extensive action to
reduce pollution and preserve the environment became louder and louder.
Therefore, in 1973, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC)
commenced a suit against the SEC in the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia, claiming that the SEC had violated the National
Environmental Policy Act by failing to promulgate comprehensive environ-
mental disclosure rules.
43
Despite the fact that the SEC prevailed in the NRDC litigation,4 the
SEC continued to expand the disclosure requirements pertaining to environ-
mental matters. In 1979, for example, Securities Act Release No. 6130 and
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,224 were promulgated, addressing-
and basically interpreting "existing requirements" in an expansive way-
three issues:
(1) When must a corporation disclose, in addition to its planned
environmental expenditures for the next two fiscal years, the total
costs of compliance with environmental statutes?
(2) What disclosures must be made concerning administrative pro-
ceedings involving environmental matters which are contemplated
40. Id.
41. Geltman, supra note 19, at 145.
42. See id. at 145-46 (citing Stephen W. Hamilton, Environmental Disclosure Require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Commission, in THE McGRAw-HILL ENVIRONMENTrAL AuDrr-
irI HANDBOOK 2-110 (L. Lee Harrison ed., 1984)). Mr. Hamilton states, "As a result,
multibillion dollar companies which were not required to disclose nonenvironmental litigation
involving hundreds of thousands of dollars were nevertheless required to disclose governmental
[environmental] proceedings involving only hundreds of dollars." Stephen W. Hamilton,
Environmental Disclosure Requirements of the Securities Exchange Commission, in THE
McGRAw-HILL ENVIRONMENTAL AuDrrzIo HANDBOOK 2-110 (L. Lee Harrison ed., 1984)
(clarification added).
43. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 692 (D.D.C.
1974).
44. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1062 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (reversing district court decision and holding that SEC did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying NRDC petition for promulgation of comprehensive rules requiring
securities law disclosure of environmental impacts of each registrant's business operations).
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by government authorities and what is an administrative proceeding
that must be disclosed?
(3) When is a corporation required to disclose its policies concerning,
or approach toward, compliance with environmental laws?
4
The 1979 release was superseded in 1982 by certain provisions of Regulation
S-K of the SEC's Integrated Disclosure System. Again, the growing mo-
mentum of the environmental movement was probably a major impetus for
the continued evaluation and amendment of SEC policy on disclosure of
environmental issues.
B. Current Regulatory Scheme Governing Securities Law
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities and Obligations
The SEC's current disclosure requirements regarding actual or potential
environmental liabilities and obligations are contained in Regulation S-K,
Item 101 (Description of Business), Item 103 (Legal Proceedings), and Item
303 (Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finances and Results of
Operations). The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has also
promulgated standards for disclosing "loss contingencies" as possible en-
vironmental liabilities; such standards are incorporated into the securities
laws. In addition, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 46
and Rule lOb-5, 47 promulgated thereunder, prohibit the making of fraudulent
misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. Failure to make the necessary disclosures under Regulation S-K,
relevant accounting standards, or Rule lOb-5, or the failure to adopt
amendments that make prior disclosures not misleading, could result in
governmental prosecutions seeking to impose civil or even criminal liability.
Finally, shareholders and investors may sue privately for damages alleging
that they have incurred losses because a registrant has made misleading
statements or omissions regarding material information. The following dis-
cussion examines in depth these pertinent areas of law requiring disclosure
of environmental liabilities and obligations.
1. Regulation S-K
a. The Integrated Disclosure System
For nearly a half century, the SEC's view that the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 promoted different objectives
served as an impediment to the implementation of common disclosure
requirements.
45. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130, Exchange
Act Release No. 16224, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507B (Sept. 27, 1979).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
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Because the [Securities Act of 1933] is oriented toward protecting
offerees in public distributions of securities whereas the [Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] is directed toward protecting secondary
market trading, it is not surprising that during the first four decades
of its existence the SEC administered the disclosure requirements
of the two acts with strict obeisance to the view that their dissimilar
objectives precluded any common disclosure requirements. 
4
However, the SEC's Integrated Disclosure System reflects a rejection of
that old view and an acceptance of a view that securities regulation is
grounded in the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. 49 "The overall ob-
jective of the SEC's integrated disclosure program is to eliminate overlapping
and unnecessary disclosure and dissemination requirements without compro-
mising the information needs of investors so that the regulatory burdens on
issuers are reduced. '50
Regulation S-K was promulgated as part of the integrated disclosure
system in 1982.51 Regulation S-K, along with the Rules and Regulations of
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, the Interpretative Re-
leases under those Acts, and the forms under those Acts, "state[ ] the
requirements applicable to the content of the non-financial statement por-
tions of"'52 the disclosure documents that public companies must file with
the SEC. The three provisions of Regulation S-K that are pertinent to
environmental disclosure are discussed below.
b. Item 101: Description of Registrant's Business
Item 101 of Regulation S-K generally requires registrants to provide a
description of their business. In regard to environmental matters, registrants
48. JAm s D. Cox ET AL., SacuTrrlas REGULATION 47 (1991).
49. See JAMES D. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND TE LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 180 (1980):
An efficient market is one in which the interaction of a large number of buyers
and sellers results in prices that fully reflect publicly available information about the
goods traded and that react virtually instantaneously to reflect new information as
it becomes available.
See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984):
Of all recent developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market
hypothesis ("ECMH") has achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture. It
... structures debate over the future of securities regulation both within and without
the Securities and Exchange Commission; it has served as the intellectual premise
for a major revision of the disclosure system administered by the Commission; and
it has even begun to influence judicial decisions and the actual practice of law. In
short, the ECMH is now the context in which serious discussion of the regulation
of financial markets takes place.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
50. Cox ET AL., supra note 48, at 48.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 et seq. (1992).
52. Id. § 229.10(a) (application of Regulation S-K).
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must disclose whether environmental compliance may have any "material
effect" on the "capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of
the registrant and its subsidiaries.
'53
Commentators have observed that Item 101 can present considerable
difficulties for registrants in an era of continual expansions of obligations
through changes in applicable environmental laws. Especially troublesome
is the requirement that the "registrant shall disclose any material estimated
capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder
of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further
periods as the registrant may deem material. ' 54 Additionally, because this
requirement essentially incorporates the 1979 release,5 5 it also necessitates
the disclosure of any information needed to make the primary disclosures
not misleading. And, as to the disclosure of future estimated expenditures,
the basis of those estimates may need to be disclosed, to the extent such
disclosure would prevent the estimates from being misleading.
56
One example of the difficulty of compliance with Item 101 in the
modern age of environmentalism arises from a basic characteristic of modern
statutes like the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Clean Air Amend-
ments). The Clean Air Act Amendments enhanced certain already stringent,
"technology-forcing" features of the Clean Air Act directed at air pollution
emissions control. 57 The problem for registrants is that "[tihey know that
there likely will be material effects of compliance with the new law, but,
53. Id. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
54. Id.
55. Geltman, supra note 19, at 151.
56. See Fishman et al., supra note 10, at 1065 n.13.
57. F. WILAM BRowNELL & LEE B. ZEUGIN, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 209-11 (1991)
(citations ommited):
The 1990 Amendments require "the maximum degree of reduction in emissions
of the hazardous air pollutants subject to this section (including a prohibition of
such emissions, where achievable) that the administrator" determines is achievable
"taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reduction, and any
non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements ...."
This standard is commonly referred to [as] "maximum achievable control technol-
ogy" or "MACT."
The 1990 Amendments require that "[n]o emission standard or other requirement
promulgated under this section shall be interpreted, construed or applied to diminish
or replace the requirements of a more stringent emission limitation or other applicable
requirement ... of this Act or a standard issued under a state authority."
See Clean Air Act § 112(d)(2), (d)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2), (d)(7) (Supp. 1993). The impact
of the 1990 amendments, therefore, is to require at least the stringency of prior law, but in
many instances to institute an even higher standard of air pollution control. See also PERCrvAL
ET AL., supra note 1, at 838-44 ("[W]hen Congress considered the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, mobile source controls were a subject of great controversy ... Congress
ultimately chose to expand the scope of mobile source controls [beyond the previous tailpipe-
oriented approach] through an even broader effort at technology forcing. The 1990 Amendments
seek to force development not only of better tailpipe controls but also of cleaner fuels and
cleaner engines . . ").
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because no implementing regulations have been promulgated, the registrants
are unable to predict either the cost of compliance or the effect compliance
is likely to have on capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive posi-
tion.""8
c. Item 103: Disclosure of Proceedings
Item 103 of Regulation S-K concerns disclosure of legal proceedings. It
reads as follows:
Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the
registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of
their property is the subject.
Include similar information as to any such proceedings known
to be contemplated by governmental authorities.5 9
Instruction 5 of Item 103 clarifies that an environmental proceeding
"shall not be deemed 'ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business'
and must be disclosed if.
A) [It] is material to the business or financial condition of the
registrant;
B) [It] involves primarily a claim for damages, or involves potential
monetary sanctions ... and the amount involved ... exceeds
10 percent of the current assets of the registrant and its sub-
sidiaries on a consolidated basis; or
C) [The government] is a party to such proceeding and [the]
proceeding involves potential monetary sanctions' [amounting
to $100,000 or more], unless the registrant reasonably believes
that the proceeding will result in no monetary sanction or the
sanctions [will be] less than $100,000.
60
When disclosing, the registrant must include all important information about
the proceeding. Further, the SEC construes the term "proceeding" in Item
103 broadly. This means, for example, that businesses must disclose admin-
istrative orders issued by a government agency regardless of whether they
are the result of a formal proceeding. Similarly, Notices of Violation (NOVs)
issued by the EPA must be disclosed, although some courts have hesitated
to mandate disclosure because such notices may lead to settlement. Finally,
and notably, Item 103 reflects a retreat from the prior requirement of
disclosure of all proceedings, regardless of their economic materiality or
significance.
58. Geitman, supra note 19, at 151.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1992) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 229.103(5).
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At one point businesses were anxious to determine whether designation
as a PRP under the CERCLA 61 requires a registrant to make disclosure of
such designation under Item 103. The concern was understandable because
CERCLA is an aggressive federal statute reflecting Congress's intent to
require that the parties responsible for contaminating abandoned land sites
or allowing them to remain contaminated clean up such sites. The statute
has been interpreted expansively and harshly: CERCLA imposes strict
liability, 62 often jointly and severally, 63 upon four broad categories of
persons." Liability is retroactive, 6 and the available defenses are limited
and rather narrow." However, the SEC answered the question in the
negative, in Securities Act Release No. 6835, stating that "[d]esignation as
a PRP does not in and of itself trigger disclosure under item 103 ... [or
Instruction 5] because PRP status alone does not provide knowledge that a
governmental agency is contemplating a proceeding." 67 But in an important
caveat, the SEC cautioned that "a registrant's particular circumstances,
when coupled with PRP status, may provide that knowledge." 6
Addressing another pressing CERCLA-related issue under Item 103,
Securities Act Release No. 6835 defines costs incurred in remedial agreements
under Superfund as "charges to income" or "capital expenditures," instead
of "monetary sanctions" under Instructions 5(B) or 5(C) to Item 103. Thus,
businesses do not have to disclose these costs. Additionally, as a related
matter, registrants may consider, when relevant, contribution, insurance,
and indemnification when determining whether they have satisfied the
criteria for disclosure under Instructions 5(A) and 5(B). This type of
interpretation could reduce any disclosure requirement under Item 103, or
obviate the requirement entirely. Further, it reflects the general interpretive
approach to Item 103 requiring substantial, but not unreasonable or dra-
conian, disclosure.
d. Item 303-Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations:
The MD&A Disclosure Requirement
While Item 303 of Regulation S-K does not explicitly address environ-
mental liabilities and obligations, its provisions have been interpreted to
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
62. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167-68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1106 (1988).
63. United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
64. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4).
65. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173.
66. See CERCLA §§ 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
67. Securitites Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,430 n.30 (1989) (explanation
added).
68. Id.
69. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988), authorizing the government to enter
into settlement agreements obligating "potentially responsible person[s]" to perform cleanup
activities at hazardous waste sites.
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require disclosure of environmental matters under relevant circumstances.
Therefore, in accordance with the general scheme of Item 303, management
must disclose, inter alia, environmental liabilities and obligations that they
could foresee in the future, and in doing so, disclose estimates of relevant
dollar amounts.
The SEC has described the purpose of Item 303 Management's Discus-
sion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure requirements as follows:
[T]o give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through
the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective
analysis of the registrant's financial condition and results of oper-
ations, with particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for
the future. 70
Under Item 303, management is required to prepare a narrative report
disclosing the registrant's financial condition and results of operations. This
requirement differs from the Item 101, Description-of-Busiiess requirement
in several ways, but the most significant difference is that disclosure must
include a discussion of "currently known trends, events, and uncertainties
that are reasonably expected to have material effects, ' 71 as opposed to
simply those that have such effects only on a current basis.! These potential
future effects could include environmental liabilities and obligations.
Additionally, disclosure must include "material events and uncertainties
known to management that would cause" 72 the information reported not to
reflect actual future results of operations, or financial conditions. This
requirement covers events and uncertainties that were important only in the
past, as well as those that will be important in the future. Item 303 also
makes reference to the safe harbor rule for "forward-looking" information,
encouraging management to voluntarily disclose information for which
disclosure is not required, but that may affect future operations. 73
1
70. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Op-
erations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange
Act Release No. 26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,436 (1989) [hereinafter Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis].
71. Id. at 22,429.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992).
73. Id. § 229.303(b)(2)6; see also Management's Discussion and Analysis, supra note 70,
at 22,429 (distinguishing between the "prospective" information required to be discussed in
Item 303 and "forward-looking" information-both of which are protected by the safe harbor
of Securities Act Rule 175(c)).
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends,
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some
prediction or projection. The distinction between the two rests with the nature of
the prediction required. Required disclosure is based on currently known trends,
events, and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such
as: A reduction in the registrant's product prices; erosion in the registrant's market
share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract.
In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future trend
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A key question in the analysis of disclosure obligations under Item 303
is: What constitutes a contingent event that requires disclosure of an
environmental uncertainty? Securities Act Release No. 6835 provides a two-
part test:
Where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known,
management must make two assessments:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not
reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, com-
mitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come
to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management deter-
mines that a material effect on the registrant's financial condition
or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.
7 4
This evaluation must be objectively reasonable at the time made.75 Signifi-
cantly, however, the MD&A test of Item 303 does not contemplate the
typical "materiality" analysis of Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and several other disclosure provisions of the securities laws. Indeed,
Securities Act Release No. 6835 expressly precludes application of the Rule
lOb-5, probability/magnitude materiality test of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
7 6
calling it "inapposite" to the materiality analysis of Item 303. 7 Instead,
the standard requires management to assume the existence of a circumstance,
for disclosure purposes, even though management is not even able to
determine whether that circumstance is likely to occur. Then management
must proceed to disclose, and somehow "evaluate objectively the conse-
quences" of the matter, unless that undeterminable-and necessarily rather
abstract-occurrence is "not reasonably likely to have a material effect."' 78
To be helpful, Securities Act Release No. 6835 sets forth a CERCLA-
PRP hypothetical and analyzes it from the standpoint of Item 303 materiality
or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or
uncertainty.
The rules establishing a safe harbor for disclosure of "forward-looking state-
ments" define such statements to include statements of "future economic perform-
ance contained in" MD&A.
Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,430 (1989).
75. Id.
76. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
77. The release provides:
MD&A mandates disclosure of specified forward-looking information, and spec-
ifies its own standard for disclosure-i.e., reasonably likely to have a material effect.
This specific standard go erns the circumstances in which Item 303 requires disclosure.
The probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by the Supreme Court in
Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.
Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,430 n.27 (1989) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 22,430.
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and disclosure. In the hypothetical, a registrant has just been "correctly"
designated a PRP by the EPA regarding the cleanup of three hazardous
substance sites. 79 Being one of several named PRPs, having no available
statutory defenses, and being unsure about the ability to obtain contribution
from other PRPs or the extent of insurance coverage, management's position
is rather predictable-as well as rather common-at this early stage of
investigation of the matter: "Management is unable to determine that a
material effect on future financial condition or results of 'operations is not
reasonably likely to occur."' 0 Therefore, concludes the SEC, "MD&A
disclosure of the effects of the PRP status, quantified to the extent reason-
ably practicable, would be required."'" However salutary the intent of the
Item 303 materiality formulation and the related environmental cleanup
hypothetical, significant criticism of both exists.
The very facts of the hypothetical itself have been said to be problematic.
For instance, it is not a foregone conclusion in every instance-particularly
in the early investigatory stages-that any registrant has been "correctly"
designated a PRP .82 Indeed, some registrants actually contest the designation
in their SEC disclosures. 3
Yet another criticism of the SEC disclosure requirements has to do with
timing problems. Given the hypothetical's setting, "[tihe registrant is in the
process of preliminary investigations of the sites to determine the nature of
its potential liability and the amount of remedial costs necessary to clean
up the sites," there could be no reasonable certainty as to the propriety of
the PRP designation and other EPA determinations until reviews existed of
both legal and technical environmental aspects of the matter. The potential
problem here is that a disclosure filing could well be due before such reviews
are completed.Y One might observe, in this regard, that the probability/
magnitude formulation of Basic allows, indeed, requires, an evaluation of
the likelihood and significance of the situation prior to disclosure. Thus, it
has been expressed that the Item 303 materiality standard could result in
premature disclosure, thereby provoking undue response from the public,
the SEC and the registrant's auditors.85
Other related criticisms of the Item 303 disclosure formulation with
respect to environmental issues are that it "underestimates the difficulty of
quantifying potential liability without detailed investigation into the avail-
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. See Geltman, supra note 19, at 162-64.
83. Id. at 163-64 (discussing 1990 Annual Report on Exchange: Act Form 10K of
Sunstrand Corporation). In the 1990 Annual Report on Exchange Act Form 10K of the
Sunstrand Corporation, Sunstrand discloses that while EPA has designated it a PRP with
respect to a certain site, the company disputed the designation. "Based on the currently
available information [Sunstrand] believes that there is no connection between its operations
and the [identified] site." Id. (explanation added).
84. Id. at 162-63.
85. Id. at 165.
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ability of contribution, insurance coverage, and legal defenses such as the
innocent purchaser defense [and it] overlooks the potential for misleading
disclosure statements in situations where registrants are forced to make
disclosures based on uncertainties."
8 6
The MD&A environmental disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K
Item 303 are the most complex of all the pertinent provisions. Correspond-
ingly, they present some of the most difficult compliance challenges. What
must now emerge from the SEC and the courts is an effective approach to
interpretation and enforcement, not only as to Item 303, but also as to all
applicable disclosure provisions.
e. Resolving Disclosure Issues Under Regulation S-K:
The Importance of a Balanced Enforcement Policy
Notwithstanding the criticisms of Regulation S-K, environmentalists,
ethical investors, and even economic investors, would support the regula-
tion's environmental disclosure requirements. To these groups, the bare fact
of disclosure, accompanied by some discussion and explanation of the matter
disclosed-however imperfect, and however unpleasant for management-
is useful. In short, and quite frankly, these groups probably would want to
know about any reasonably important matters involving environmental
issues. And while managers are wise to be concerned about the sometimes
precipitous responses of the public, the regulators, and the product and
financial markets, managers should not make the facile assumption that the
markets and their participants are naive creatures, incapable of processing
and analyzing information accurately.
This same point emerged as part of the rationale in Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.8 7 In Basic, the Supreme Court rejected
the "agreement-in-principle" definition of materiality in part because "[ilt
assumes that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate-even when told-
that mergers [about which the plaintiff had contended preliminary negotia-
tions should have been disclosed] are risky propositions up until the clos-
ing." 88 Justice Blackmun observed, in this regard:
We have recognized time and again, a "fundamental purpose" of
the various securities acts, "was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."
The role of the materiality requirement is not to "attribute to
investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic
significance of negotiations". . . but to filter out essentially useless
86. Id. at 171.
87. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
88. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d
1169, 1175 (1987)).
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information that a reasonable investor would not consider signifi-
cant, even as part of a larger "mix" of factors to consider in
making his investment decision. 9
Although these views emerged in the context of the Basic probability/
magnitude materiality analysis of the disclosure duty-expresssly rejected
by the SEC in Item 303-the thrust of those views transcends the specific
issue in that case. This language in Basic identifies decisionmaking by fully
knowledgeable investors as one of the fundamental objectives of the secu-
rities regulatory system; it assumes that those investors, and the market,
will assess information reasonably and rationally.
Perhaps one question in particular may be both illuminhting and helpful
in the debate over the quite understandable concerns raised by promanage-
ment interests about Item 303 environmental disclosure: Precisely how will
the SEC and the courts react to careful, reasonable, good faith attempts
by registrants to comply with Item 303, given the almost demon-like
constraints of uncertainty, time, and cost? A reasonable--but disclosure-
oriented-interpretation of the duty of registrants under lItem 303 would
greatly facilitate that provision's effectiveness and fairness to all parties
concerned.
2. Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose
Environmental Liabilities and Obligations 9°
Some commentators have called section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193491 and Rule lOb-5, 92 promulgated under the authority of Section
89. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
90. Rule lob-5 does not begin to exhaust the field of antifraud or other liability provisions
of the securities laws; nor does this Article purport to exhaust that field. But, because the
rule constitutes the broadest, most frequently asserted antifraud provision in the securities laws
(even when other provisions are asserted concurrently), and because the analysis of cases under
other provisions includes some of the same elements and dynamics as Rule 10b-5, that rule
has been chosen for analysis here.
As to the full range of liabilities, including the antifraud provisions, see generally Cox
ET AL., supra note 48.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
Id.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991). Hereafter, both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will be
referred to collectively as "Rule 10b-." Rule 10b-5 provides in full as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls or of any facility
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10(b), a "broad, catch-all" antifraud provision. 9 Indeed, the Supreme
Court, in a now well-known phrase, has referred to the rule as "a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
' 94
Although no general duty to disclose information exists under the rule,
95
when the requisite elements of a Rule lob-5 cause of action are pleaded
and proved, defendants in these actions may be held liable for material
misstatements or omissions made in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. Further, the rule would apply even when none of the initial,
periodic, or continuous mandatory disclosure provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts that draw upon Regulation S-K apply, so long as the underlying
circumstances can be construed to create a duty of disclosure. This additional
layer of disclosure, creating a sort of "interstitial" disclosure requirement
when considered along with the mandatory disclosure provisions, 96 only adds
to the anxieties of managers who are concerned about the effect of envi-
ronmental disclosures upon the financial image of their companies.
a. The Evolution of the Rule lOb-5 Cause of Action and
Prospects for Actions Based on Environmental Matters
A series of Supreme Court and other federal court decisions over the
past fifty years have elucidated the basic features of Rule 10b-5, including
the basic elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. The following discussion
summarizes the more significant holdings and comments on the prospects
for Rule 10b-5 actions based on failures to disclose substantial environmental
liabilities and observations.
During its early years, the rule enjoyed rapid growth in its use by
private litigants. Especially pivotal in this regard were a spate of cases
interpreting the rule expansively. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,97 holding
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id.
93. CHARLES R. O'KELY, JR. & ROBERT B. THoaipsON, CORPORATIONS AND OTmR
BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS 839 (1992).
94. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
95. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
96. Mandatory disclosure filing requirements are those expressly required by the securities
laws. Included here are those statutes and rules requiring filings for initial distributions of
securities, quarterly and annual reports, proxy materials, and the like. See Cox ET AL., supra
note 48, at 45-49.
97. 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947). It is noteworthy that by the time the
retrenchment bound Supreme Court of the mid-1970s had a chance to address the implied
private right of Rule 10b-5, it had been an accepted part of the rule's jurisprudence for three
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that an implied private right of action existed under Rule lOb-5, is a well-
known example. From the mid-1970s forward, however, the Supreme Court
handed down a series of opinions having the effect of making Rule lOb-5
narrower in scope and certainly more complicated analytically.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,98 for example, the Supreme
Court construed the rule's language "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of securities to impose a standing requirement: the rule would be
available only to plaintiffs who had purchased or sold the securities at issue
during the relevant period of the fraud.99 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'l°
further limited the scope of the rule to those instances in which defendants
had acted with "scienter," described by the Supreme Court in that case as
"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."'1'
Caselaw holdings subsequent to Ernst & Ernst lessened its restrictive
effect to some extent, including "recklessness" within the definition of
scienter. 0 2 In environmental cases, this development would not be helpful
to defendants. Extensive monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping
requirements' 3 in many modern environmental statutes give rise to an
decades. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-206, 215-18 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727-31.
Also, the facts of Kardon illustrate another feature of Rule 10b-5 that contributed to its
expansive applicability: that securities fraud involving private as well as public companies are
includable in the scope of the rule. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp.
798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (describing four person owned corporation whose stock was at issue).
This expansive scope (unique among the Exchange Act liability provisions, which otherwise
tend to apply only to "registered" Exchange Act securities) derives directly from the language
of Section 10(b). That section declares it unlawful:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities eschange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance ....
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
Finally, from a jurisdictional standpoint, Rule lOb-5 offers numerous advantages: nation-
wide service of process; liberal venue provisions; generous discovery rules; opportunity to
include state law claims under federal pendent jurisdiction concepts; and no bond or security
for expenses statutes for derivative suits, as in some state courts. The "interstate commerce"
requirement was also quite easy to meet. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONs 948-49
(4th ed. 1990).
98. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
99. Id. at 749-55. One must bear in mind, however, that this limitation does not apply
to the SEC.
100. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
101. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
102. Although the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder decided it "need not address
here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under [the rule]," id., the Court subsequently held in a later case that recklessness is
indeed included within the term. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
103. See ENVIRONMENTAL Aurnrs, supra note 7, 111-10 to 111-13:
IT]he environmental statutes impose [monitoring,] reporting and recordkeeping [re-
quirements on] regulated entities and there are varying but significant penalties for
corporations and individuals for the failure to report, the submission of false
information, and/or the destruction of required records. Criminal penalties are
imposed for knowing and wilful false statements.
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abundance of facts to support prosecutorial allegations that environmental
violations were intentional, or at least reckless. Thus, liberal interpretations
of the term scienter only serve to make the prospects more bleak for
defendants in environmental cases.
In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,104 the Court continued the narrowing
process, purporting as always to base its conclusion on a strict construction
of the statute.105 The Court held in Santa Fe that when a complaint alleges
facts or transactions that are "neither deceptive nor manipulative" there
can be no cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5.' 6 While this requirement, like
the scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst, could pose problems of proof
in environmental cases, the same counterveiling reasons why proof of this
element is still eminently achievable apply here as in the scienter situation.
Continuing its prior thrust, the Court elaborated further on the place
of common-law fraud elements in Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence. Causation and
reliance, of course,. have been incorporated, although their proof require-
ments were reconfigured, both to make up for common-law deficiencies
and to take into account the special problems of proof presented by the
nature of modern securities transactions and markets. Interestingly, the
interpretations of causation and reliance (e.g., its acceptance of the "fraud-
on-the-market" theory of reliance) constitute virtually the only expansive
ones in recent years by the Supreme Court in the Rule lOb-5 area10
7
Materiality is another common-law fraud element that has been incor-
porated into Rule lOb-5. Because materiality, in some form or another,
104. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
105. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977):
Ernst & Ernst makes clear that in deciding whether a complaint states a cause of
action for "fraud" under Rule l0b-5, "we turn first to the language of [section]
10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is
the language itself."'
106. Id. at 474.
107. See Geltman, supra note 19, at 143 n.97:
Proof of this requirement ["transaction causation," which, along with "loss cau-
sation" constitute the element of causation] may be subsumed under the elements
of reliance, materiality, and the purchaser-seller requirement.
Citing Harris v. Union Electric Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823
(1986); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 884 (1984); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 n.11 (2d Cir.
1974).
With regard to the "new-and-improved" proof requirements for reliance, see O'KELLEY
& THOMPSON, supra note 93, at 889.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson [485 U.S. 224 (1988)], a four-justice majority accepted
the fraud on the market theory .... The theory permits plaintiffs to meet the
reliance requirement by reliance on the integrity of the market price rather than
directly on the challenged disclosure. Thus investors do not have to show that they
read the misleading documents. Even prior to Basic, federal courts had interpreted
the reliance requirement in a way to assist plaintiffs. In the case of omissions, courts
recognized the difficulty of proving reliance on silence and presumed reliance. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Fraud-on-the market
extends a similar presumption to all omissions or affirmative misrepresentations for
actively traded stocks.
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tends to be central in triggering a duty to disclose in the securities laws, its
precise definition is obviously important. So, the Court's 'decision in Basic
v. Levinson, Inc., resolving a conflict among the circuits, was a much
awaited development in Rule lOb-5 law. The Court held that the test of
materiality under the rule was the same as the test it had earlier articulated
in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,08 in the context of Exchange Act
proxy solicitation disclosure:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote.' °9
[T]here must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made
available." 0
Because the subject matter of the action in Basic concerned the duty to
disclose preliminary merger negotiations, the Court elaborated on the TSC
Industries formulation, discussing the nature of the materiality analysis in
the context of "contingent or speculative information or events." Quoting
from the Second Circuit's opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,"' the
Court stated:
[Materiality, in these special circumstances] will depend at any given
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light
of the totality of the company activity."
2
The probability/magnitude test of materiality appears to be particularly
applicable to environmental cases, given that environmental liabilities are
usually "contingent or speculative in nature""' and thus invite the kind of
analysis contemplated in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson." 4 Further, in the current
climate of high probabilities and substantial magnitudes of environmental
liabilities and obligations, positive determinations of materiality are a defi-
nite possibility.
Overall, Rule 10b-5 has had an illustrious career, commencing in grand
style and later losing some of its expansive scope primarily at the hands of
the Supreme Court. Yet, notwithstanding the relatively constrictive rulings
as to its scope in recent years, the rule continues to be a powerful tool for
108. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
109. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
110. Id.
111. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
112. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
113. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
114. Geltman, supra note 19, at 139.
1118
1993] DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
both private plaintiffs and the SEC in deterring failures to disclose material
misstatements and omissions of fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.
b. Some General Observations about Rule lOb-5
and Environmental Disclosure
The basic import of the previous discussion is that if the elements of a
Rule lOb-5 cause of action are established, corporations may be liable to
securityholders and the SEC when managements cause those companies to
make material misstatements or omissions with respect to environmental
liabilities and obligations."15 Further, the practical effect of the rule on
managements is to obligate them to make disclosures, in qualifying instances,
at times that may be considerably prior to those imposed by mandatory
disclosure requirements. Given management angst about the problems of
timing, uncertainty and cost discussed above with respect to initial, periodic
and continuous mandatory disclosure, one can imagine the potential for
mischief the rule poses.
Rule lOb-5 has considerable potential for effective use as a weapon
against securities fraud involving inadequate environmental disclosure. Al-
though there is at present a dearth of cases invoking the rule to attack
allegedly misleading statements on environmental matters,"16 the highly "ma-
terial" nature of environmental issues in modern times is likely to be the
central, driving force in the high prospects for Rule lOb-5 applicability in
environmental matters.
3. Financial Statement Disclosure of Environmental
Liabilities: Accounting Issues
a. Accounting Standards and the Securities Laws
In addition to the array of potential environmental disclosure obligations
under Regulation S-K and Rule lOb-5, SEC-regulated companies may also
have to reflect environmental liabilities and obligations in the financial
statements that they must file along with their SEC disclosure documents.
The obligation of SEC-regulated companies to include financial state-
ments with their filings was usefully described by a federal district court in
Arthur Anderson & Co. v. SEC 7:
115. See Levine v. NL Indus., 717 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d 199
(2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing, on "materiality" grounds, suit by shareholder claiming material
misstatements and omissions regarding environmental liabilities in disclosure documents, but
not disavowing validity of environmental disclosure actions under Rule lOb-5).
116. One of the few cases in this area-and certainly the best-known one-is Levine v.
NL Indus., 717 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991). There, the
district court's dismissal was affirmed at the circuit level. The allegely omitted material
information regarding potential environmental liability was "immaterial" because the federal
agency involved had agreed to indemnify the nondisclosing company for any environmental
liability. 926 F.2d at 203.
117. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,720, at 90,484 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1976).
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[Companies] subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC ... are required
to include financial statements together with [an independent public
accounting firm's] audit reports thereon and filings under the various
[securities] Acts which are administered and enforced by the SEC.
These filings include, but are not limited to registration statements
filed pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and annual and periodic
reports and proxy statements filed pursuant to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.
In all of these filings, the [company] is required to observe the
rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC which govern the
form and content of financial statements; in particular, the plaintiff
is required to observe the SEC's Regulation SX governing accounting
presentations and filings with the SEC." '
"Because financial statements are the heart of SEC disclosure, the Com-
mission has been given power to fix accounting principles with respect to
all these disclosure documents .... [Yet] [d]espite its power to fix account-
ing principles, the task is far beyond the Commission's means and has been
ceded to the accounting profession." '" 9 For example, in its 1938 Accounting
Series Release (ASR) No. 4, entitled Administrative Policy on Financial
Statements, the SEC stated:
In cases where financial statements filed with this commission
pursuant to its rules and regulations under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are prepared in
accordance with accounting principles for which there is not sub-
stantial authoritative support, such financial statements will be
presumed to be misleading or inaccurate.... 120
Thus, through the establishment of this negative presumption against ac-
counting practices not generally accepted within the accounting profession
and the respected published papers, opinions, and other literature in the
area, ASR No. 4 had the effect of promoting adherence to then evolving
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Standing behind the
SEC's policy was its "lead pipe" authority to prevent a company from
selling securities to the public or to seek-administratively or judicially-
other forms of drastic relief.'
2'
But, again, the SEC has chosen to act more as an overseer when
rulemaking is concerned, reserving its exercise of power mostly for the
118. Arthur Anderson & Co. v. SEC, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,720, at 90,483 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 3, 1976) (oral opinion from the bench by Judge Prentice Marshall).
119. TED J. Fixs, ACCOUNTING ISSUES FOR LAwYERS 89-90 (4th ed. 1991). For a fuller
discussion of SEC authority to regulate -financial disclosure and fix accounting principles, see
Ted J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAno.
L. REv. 31, 52-62 (1975).
120. Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4,
Securities and Exchange Commission (1938).
121. Fretis, supra note 119, at 91-95.
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compliance and enforcement spheres. Accordingly, Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 150 announced that:
[P]rinciples, standards and practices promulgated by the [Financial
Accounting Standards Board, the principal independent accounting
standards rulemaking body] will be considered by the Commission
as having substantial authoritative support, and those contrary to
such FASB promulgations will be considered to have no such
support.122
b. Accounting for Environmental Contingencies
Under certain circumstances, businesses may reasonably expect that they
will have certain liabilities or obligations, based on past activities, but not
resulting in a claim or assessment until some time in the future. Perhaps,
for example, an explosion occurred or some harmful substance escaped into
the environment during the production process, resulting in serious injury
to company employees and local citizens and causing damage to the property
of others. So far, however, no one has filed a claim, but there is, of course,
a strong possibility that suits will be filed.
In the aftermath and at the point when management prepares its
financial statements for the period inclusive of those events, it is reasonable
to think that some amount representing what the company may eventually
have to pay, based on harm it clearly caused, should be reflected in the
liabilities and (reduced) earnings of that company. 123 Such reasoning would
be valid even though lawsuits-and judgments-are not yet a reality, but
are probable. This is the basic idea behind accounting for loss contingencies.
The FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.
5, Accounting for Contingencies,12 4 addresses "loss contingencies," for
which a certain likelihood exists that a "future event or events will confirm
the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.I'
' 5
Paragraph 8 of SFAS No. 5 is the heart of the rule; it sets forth the
standard by which a company must judge whether it must reduce its
earnings, as reflected in its financial statements, based on a contingency:
122. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles
and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (1973).
123. A major objective of accrual accounting, which is the type of accounting represented
by GAAP, is the proper "matching" of revenues and expenses that by some reasonable
standard should be reported in the same period. The "Periodic Report Convention" is to
accrual accounting, and gives rise to the need for accrual and deferral procedures in accounting.
See generally Fifus, supra note 119, at 69.
Accounting for contingencies is a logical extension of this basic philosophy, applied to
past events involving a company that create losses by some other person, or create rights in
them, but which have not yet been reduced to a legal right to collect by some other person.
124. AccouNTiNG FOR CONTINGENCMS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter SFAS No. 5].
125. Id. 3.
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An estimated loss from a loss contingency ... shall be accrued by
a charge to income if both of the following conditions are met:
(a) Information available prior to issuance of the financial state-
ments indicates that it is probable126 that an asset had been impaired
or a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial state-
ments. It is implicit in this condition that it must be probable that
one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the
loss.
(b) The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.
27
As SFAS No. 5, paragraph 8 indicates, both of its conditions must be
met before a charge to earnings is required. But even when "one or both
of the conditions ... are not met, or if an exposure to loss exists in excess
of the amount accrued pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8, disclosure
of the contingency [in the notes to the financial statements] shall be made
when there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss or an additional
loss may have incurred."' 2 Further, FASB Interpretation No. 14 requires
accrual of the most likely estimate of the loss. 29
One can easily envision the applicability of SFAS No.5 to environmental
matters. Such an assumption is only further strengthened by the examples
of loss contingencies provided in paragraph 4 of the rule. They include
"[p]ending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and
assessments."' 30 Indeed, these categories, along with obligations to make
capital and operating expenditures, constitute the main sources of the
economic burden of environmental regulation.
The difficulty of arriving at environmental cleanup estimates is not a
problem under the rule. To be sure, it is true that "[e]stimates can vary
dramatically due to the myriad of contaminants and their effect on the
environment, the many alternative cleanup technologies, and the problem
that neither the Superfund law nor the . . . EPA clearly defines what
constitutes an acceptable cleanup.''3 But the rule addresses this scenario
by requiring "textual," or written, disclosure, at a minimum, and probably
also the actual accrual of a minimum cost figure in the financial state-
126. "Probable" is the highest level of likelihood of occurrence under SFAS No. 5. When
a future event that "will confirm the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a
liability," is likely to occur, it is "probably" under the rule. Id. 3(a).
"Remote" means the "chance of the future event or events occurring is slight," id. I
3(c), while "reasonably possible" lies between "probable" and "remote." Id. I 3(b).
127. Id. 8 (emphasis added).
128. 1d. 110 (emphasis added). "The disclosure shall indicate the nature of the contingency
and shall give an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss or state that such an estimate
cannot be made." Id.
129. Karen M. Doren, Hazardous Waste Treatment Costs Emerge as a Significant Ac-
counting Issue, INsiGaTs, Apr. 1990, at 35.
130. SFAS No. 5, supra note 124, 4(e), (f).
131. Doren, supra note 129, at 35. Additionally, further investigation may give rise to
changes in estimates, and the existence of several designated PRPs can truly complicate the
estimation process. Id.
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ments.'3 2 In fact, an SEC staffmember has expressed this same view.'
Another difficult area under SEAS No. 5 concerns a registrant's accrual
or disclosure obligations in instances of litigation, claims and assessments.
Paragraph 33 of the rules provides that:
[The] following factors .. . must be considered in determining
whether accrual and/or disclosure is required with respect to pending
or threatened litigation and actual or possible claims and assess-
ments:
(a) The period in which the underlying cause ... of action ...
of the pending or threatened litigation or of the actual or possible
claim or assessment occurred.
(b) The degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome.
(c) The ability to make a reasonable estimate of the amount of
loss.13 4
This complex area of disclosure not only presents difficulties for manage-
ment, but also creates legal and ethical dilemmas for the company's legal
counsel and auditor. 3 5 Nevertheless, the SEC appears to be more than
willing, in these days of emphasis on environmental disclosure, to put the
company to the test of providing the greatest amount of information
reasonably possible.
3 6
As in the previously discussed areas, the definite and substantial nature
of environmental liabilities and obligations, considered along with the fun-
damental emphasis on disclosure under GAAP, makes the prospects for
applicability of SFAS No. 5 in this area considerable.
132. Id. at 35.
133. Theresa lannaconi, Current Accounting Issues and Related Developments Affecting
the Division of Corporation Finance, Course Materials, The Role of the Lawyer in Advising
on SEC Accounting Requirements 17 (May 20, 1992) (unpublished course material; transcript
on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) ("If management is able to determine that
the amount of the liability is likely to fall within a range and no amount within the range can
be determined to be the better estimate, the registrant should record the minimum amount of
the range pursuant to [FASB Interpretation No. 14]"). Generally, Ms. lannaconi observes:
The [SEC] staff believes that it is the responsibility of management to accumulate
on a timely basis sufficient relevant and reliable information to make a reasonable
estimate of its probable liability.
The measurement of a liability for environmental cleanup should be based on
currently enacted laws and regulations on existing technology. A registrant should
consider all avilable evidence including the registrant's prior experience in cleaning
up contaminated sites, other companies' experience, and data released by EPA.
Id. See also SEC Staff Accounting Bull. No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993).
134. SFAS No. 5, supra note 124, 33.
135. See Frmas, supra note 119, at 349-58 (describing this complicated dynamic, which
can pit management, legal counsel and auditor against one another).
136. lannaconi, supra note 133, at 17-18.
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C. Final Observations Pertaining
to SEC Environmental Disclosure Requirements
Without question, rigorous environmental regulation and rigorous se-
curities disclosure regulation have created an atmosphere in which failures
of compliance, or even lax compliance, can be perilous, and even terminal,
for businesses. Against this backdrop, and specifically considering the
economic and financial dynamics created by this regulatory setting, the next
topic for consideration is the new prospects for market-oriented environ-
mental compliance incentives directed towards public companies.
III. DiscLosuRE, SECURITIES MARKETS, AND THE PROSPECTS OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. The Emergence of Economic Incentives in
Environmental Regulation
Recently, "economic incentive approaches for enhancing environmental
quality have moved to center stage in Washington [D.C.]."' 137 Echoing this
observation is a 1991 public policy study promoted by U.S. Senators
Timothy Wirth and John Heinz, which states that: "Over the past two
years, we have witnessed dramatic changes in the political landscape of
environmental policy. Legislators, bureaucrats, environmentalists, business
persons, and citizens of all kinds have come to recognize that market-based
instruments belong in our portfolio of environmental and natural resource
policies."'3
137. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 3, at 20 (clarification added); see PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 824:
The Bush Administration has actively sought opportunities for incorporating market-
based policies into the Air Act, a bipartisan group chaired by Senator Wirth and
the late Senator Heinz endorsed this strategy, as did the Environmental Defense
Fund. While Congress previously had enacted a tax on emissions of chlorofluoro-
carbons as part of the strategy for protection of the ozone layer, . . . the acid rain
control program incorporated in title IV of the 1990 Amendments arguably provides
the first robust test of market-based policies.
See also Scmiaimrm, supra note 3, at 19, in which the author explains:
[T]hree basic mechanisms can be used to move business to internalize environmental
costs, to pay for the costs of pollution, or to limit damage to the environment by
other means:
-Command and control: These are basically government regulations, including per-
formance standards for technologies and products, effluent and emission standards,
and so on.
-Self-regulation: These are initiatives by corporations or sectors of industry to regulate
themselves through standards, monitoring, pollution reduction targets, and the like.
-Economic instruments: These are efforts to alter the prices of resources and of
goods and services in the marketplace via some form of government action that will
affect the cost of production and/or consumption.
Id.
138. PROJECT 88-ROUND Two (Robert Stavins ed., 1991), quoted in ScmEmlrmyi, supra
note 3, at 24-25.
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Why so much emphasis on market forces? In answer to this question,
the Wirth and Heinz study gives the following answer:
Selective and careful use of economic incentives can enable us to
achieve greater levels of environmental protection at lower overall
cost to society. A central principle is that as consumers and as
producers, each and every one of us needs to weigh the full social
costs and consequences of our decisions before acting .... Market-
based environmental policy mechanisms provide various ways to
make consumers and producers recognize these social costs and
consequences, and thus provide incentives for environmental pro-
tection. The creativity and power of the market-the awesome
strength of millions of decentralized decision-makers-can be de-
ployed on behalf of environmental protection, instead of againstit. 13
Although there is no definitive statement of what constitutes a market-
based, or economic, instrument, "all of them involve intervention by
government in the marketplace through mechanisms such as pollution taxes
and charges, tradable pollution permits and resource quotas, deposit-refund
systems (as with glass bottles), performance bonds, resource saving credits,
differential prices (as with unleaded versus leaded gasoline), special depre-
ciation provisions, and the removal of subsidies and barriers to market
activity."'14 These government-initiated vehicles attempt to alter the prices
of resources and of goods and services in the marketplace with the express
intent of affecting the nature and cost of production or consumption.'4'
1. Is Securities Regulation an Economic Instrument for
Environmental Pollution Control Purposes?
Notwithstanding the fairly wide range suggested by the parameters and
examples described above, the complex nature of the subject here warrants
a careful answer to the question posed. Specifically, one can most accurately
state that the dynamic created by securities law duties to disclose environ-
mental matters exhibits some characteristics of an economic instrument.
To illustrate this dynamic, we start with the basic proposition that the
federal regulatory scheme requiring disclosure of material environmental
liabilities by public companies greatly facilitates the transmission of mean-
139. Id. at 25; see also ScnHmm-Y, supra note 3, at 21-22:
The growing interest in the use of economic instruments stems from four needs: to
provide continuous rewards and incentives for continuous improvements, to use
markets more effectively in achieving environmental objectives, to find more cost-
effective ways for both government and industry to achieve these same objectives,
and to move from pollution control to pollution prevention.
140. SCHUMEMINY, supra note 3, at 22.
141. Id. at 19.
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ingful information to the securities markets. 42 This transmission is likely to
diminish the value of an issuer's securities where the information has
negative implications with respect to profitability.143 Such an undesirable
economic consequence'4 may carry the potential for inducing changes in
142. Many commentators believe that the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis manifests
in the real world in terms of "relatively efficient" markets. That is, "the extent of market
efficiency is a function of the cost of acquiring information, and thus capital market efficiency
depends on the structure of the market for information." WILLIAM A. KLEIN & Jom C.
COFFEE, JR., BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 397 (5th ed. 1993) (citing Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 49). Thus, from this relative efficiency perspective, the disclosure-
oriented federal securities regulatory system may be described in terms of the nature of its
contribution to efficient capital markets as follows:
To generalize, those who take this "relative" efficiency perspective argue that the
speed of the market's response will depend upon the initial distribution of the
information. Because the initial distribution of information is, in turn, largely a
function of its cost, it follows that the cheaper the information is to acquire, the
more efficient will be the market. From this perspective, one may think of the
federal securities laws and the SEC as a strategy for the collectivation and broad
dissemination of securities information, in order thereby both to reduce the cost of
information acquisition and to increase the speed of its dissemination.
KLEIN & COME, supra, at 397 (emphasis added).
143. The fundamental idea here, of course, is that bad news about a company will
generally lower the price-or market valuation-of its securities. Stated in the language of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, "new information that bears on the expected risk or
return of an asset is quickly reflected in the asset's price." RONALD J. GILsON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANcE OF COROA'TE AcQuisrIToNs 54 (1992 Supp.) (describing "semi-
strong" form of Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis).
It is useful to emphasize here that the semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis does not require perfect conditions with respect to transaction costs, distribution
of information, and the like. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 761, 771 (1985).
It is not difficult to specify conditions under which capital markets will inevitably
be speculatively efficient: no transaction costs in trading securities, costless access
by all market participants to all available information, and agreement by market
participants as to implications of such information for the current price and distri-
butions of future price of each security (i.e., homoyenous expectations). Prices that
prevail under these conditions by definition "fully reflect" all available information.
The efficient market hypothesis, however, purports to make a strong statement where
some of these conditions are not present. It states that despite transaction costs, the
lack of universal access to available information, and differing assessments of
information, prevailing prices fully reflect available information.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. Given that bad news, among other things, can adversely affect a public issuer's
security prices in a developed market, there are any number of reasons why that issuer would
not be happy to see such price depression.
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of an issuer's plight under such circumstances occurs
during a planned public sale of stock when, simultaneously, bad news about the company
becomes public and lowers the market value of its existing stock in the secondary market. See
Cox ET AL., supra note 48, at 314. "If the issuer's security is falling in value in the market
at the same time the underwriters are distributing a new offering of that security, the
underwriter's life is not an easy one." Id. Obviously, the price per share or unit of the security
offered-and ultimately the overall proceeds of the distribution-will probably be limited by
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company environmental policies and practices. Correspondingly, fines and
other penalties for violations of those same disclosure requirements may
tend to induce both future securities law compliance and changes in company
operating behavior.
The diminution of security prices, or the imposition of penalties for
nondisclosure, can be characterized as "taxes" or "effluent charges" in an
economic-incentive structure:
Faced with these taxes or "effluent charges" [in the form of reduced
value of its securities, or non-disclosure penalties], each firm [may]
find it in its own interest to reduce pollution by an amount related
to the cost of [pollution] reduction, and through the use of the
least-cost means of doing so. It would compare the cost of paying
the effluent charge with the cost of cleaning up pollution, and
would choose to remove pollution up to the point where the
additional cost of removal was greater than the effluent charge.'
45
A company will not automatically change its environmental behavior in
every instance in which negative information could damage its stock prices.
The company will compare its cost of environmental compliance with the
benefits of doing so (higher stock prices, or no penalties for nondisclosure),
and it will decide whether, or to what extent, it is advantageous to enhance
its environmental policies and practices. This "least cost" approach, whereby
"[flirms are assumed to choose their combination of inputs so as to minimize
the total cost of production,"' 46 is a fundamental principle in the micro-
economic decisionmaking process of the firm and is a typical component
the diminished market value of existing publicly held stock.
Indeed, so substantial is the adverse effect on issuers and underwriters of distributions
under these circumstances that the SEC found it necessary to promulgate Rule lOb-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.I0b-6 (1992). Adopted in 1955 by the SEC under the authority of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, Rule lOb-6 has the specific objective of deterring issuers and other "key
participants in a distribution from bidding or purchasing securities of the same class as those
being distributed until they have completed their participation in the distribution. The rule is
intended to prevent those involved in the distribution of securities from artificially conditioning
the market for securities to facilitate the distribution." Cox Er AL., supra note 48, at 314.
145. CHARLES A. SCHULTZE Fr AL., SErING NATIONAL PRiosunms: THm 1973 BUDGET,
quoted in ROGER W. FmDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENvmoNmENTAL LAW 350 (3d ed. 1991)
(clarification added).
146. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WIL.AM D. NoPDHAus, EcoNoMIcs 523 (13th ed. 1989).
Least-cost rule: To produce a given level of output at least cost, a firm will hire
factors until it has equalized the marginal product per dollar spent on each factor
of production. This implies that
Marginal product of L = marginal product of A
Price of L price of A
Id. at 524. "[The rule] simply states that, whatever the level of output, the firm should strive
to produce that output at the lowest possible cost and thereby have the maximum amount of
revenue left over for profits or other objectives." Id. at 523.
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of economic incentive-based environmental protection schemes. 147
Yet, notwithstanding the similarities between the securities law mecha-
nism and many of the emerging systems of economic environmental com-
pliance incentives, some significant differences exist. In the emerging systems,
for example, government regulators usually establish charges in such a way
that the decision simply to pay charges and continue substantially polluting
the environmnent is economically prohibitive. The ultimate objective, of
course, is to promote environmental protection."'
No such procedure or device inheres in the securities 'law mechanism,
primarily because that mechanism merely-and quite unintentionally-cre-
ates a dynamic. This dynamic consists of a set of relationships between and
among environmental liabilities and obligations, their required disclosure,
and securities prices. This dynamic sometimes produces useful consequences
from an environmental protection standpoint. Therefore, the mechanism is
not the result of a set of premeditated objectives in the securities laws to
protect the environment, but rather, the result of market forces interacting
with governmental regulation.
At best, and subject to the cost-benefit relation just described, environ-
mentally beneficial behavior will flow from securities law enforcement only
as a consequence of the pursuit of the primary goals of securities law:
protecting investors and the securities markets through full and fair disclo-
sure. Nevertheless, this securities law dynamic has provided beneficial results
from an environmental protection standpoint. 49 As such, those laws, along
147. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems:
How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, J. ECON. PERsp., Spring 1989, at 95, 104-06.
148. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH Ec-
ONOMIC INCENTIVES 5-7, 105 (1977):
The activity would then pay for the resources it consumes, like any other economic
activity. Since computing total social damages poses enormous practical difficulties,
it will probably not be possible to attain this ideal. However, given a legislatively
determined level of environmental quality as a goal, the average costs of controlling
environmental harms in various industries could be used to design a charge that
achieves a high level of efficiency, even if it does not perfectly reflect all of an
activity's social costs.
[C]harges would be used to achieve predetermined environmental standards and
would be based on a rough and ready estimate either of the costs of environmental
control of various industries, services, and municipalities, or upon an estimate,
somewhat sociological in nature, of the charge that will induce citizens and consumers
to modify their behavior.
Id. at 5-7 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,622 (July
2, 1980); SEC v. Allied Chemical Corp., Civ. No. 77-373 (D.D.C. 1977). Both cases involved
SEC enforcement proceedings in which the defendant companies signed consent decrees
requiring them to develop comprehensive audit programs. The purpose of the audit programs
was to ensure management awareness of environmental matters and inclusion of those matters
in the business decisionmaking process. See also Janet D. Smith, Environmental Disclosures
Required by Federal Securities Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN FINANCING AND SECU-
Rrrms DIsCLosuRE: AvomINo TE RISKS 9, 21-22 (1991).
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with the SEC's enthusiastic application of them, have served to create
economic incentives for pollution control in a rather general, but often
important, way.
Finally, and independent of the SEC's role, considerable potential may
exist for the use of the dynamic by private investors. In fact, some experts
have noted the immense potential and have predicted optimistically that,
increasingly, investors will act voluntarily and strategically to establish
economic incentives for higher levels of environmental protection by public
companies. 150 It is in these circumstances that the similarity between the
securities law mechanism and other current economic incentive schemes is
potentially greatest.
2. SEC Disclosure as a Mechanism to Promote
"Full Cost" Accounting of Environmental Costs in
Market Valuations of Securities Prices
Another beneficial effect would flow from the dynamic discussed here,
even when a company decides no economic advantage exists in changing its
environmental compliance patterns, and thus decides to accept adverse
effects on its security prices resulting from disclosure of negative environ-
mental information. By requiring disclosure and punishing disclosure viol-
ations and other securities-related wrongdoing, securities laws promote the
public's interest in the accuracy of securities prices and the general integrity
of securities markets. And in so promoting accurate securities prices and
reliable markets, the securities regulatory regime contributes to a phenom-
enon known in the economic and environmental arenas as "full cost pricing"
or "green accounting":
[P]roduct prices very often do not represent the actual costs of
production. If, for example, a given production process (or activity)
produces emissions of deleterious effect to the environment, these
150. See Sc M'HErNY, supra note 3, at 64-65:
Of growing importance among financial intermediaries in today's markets are the
institutional investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, and portfolio
management specialists .... Their significance lies in the sheer volume of funds
under their management and the power this provides.
If the message of sustainable development can be transmitted convincingly to
these institutions, the cumulative effect could be enormous.
There is also a growing awareness among individual investors of the need to
take account of environmental considerations. This concern is currently focussed
mainly on more emotive issues, such as deforestation, the greenhouse effect, or
endangered species, but it may in time become more sophisticated. Just as public
opinion has been seen to oppose investment in certain countries for political reasons
(apartheid in South Africa, for example), so it is probable that individual investors
will increasingly take account of the environmental performance of individual cor-
porations or economic groups in their portfolio strategies.
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emissions generate costs. Deterioration of terrestrial or acquatic
environments, health effects, materials damage, or even diminution
of aesthetic values, are all costs of the production process. However,
these costs are generally not born by the producer but by the society
as a whole ("social costs"). Such "externalities" or "spillovers"
are the result of the producer's goal to maximize profits ... The
negative effect is multiplied when the consumer, influenced by
misleadingly low prices, buys the polluting products, which, in turn,
may lead to expanded production.' 5'
Similarly, in the securities setting, the market mechanism would discount
the price of a security-a "financial product"-by some figure representing
a theretofore undisclosed liability or obligation. That liability or obligation,
of course, will have been deemed properly includable as a "cost of doing
business." Therefore, when the company discloses that cost, and thereby
introduces the information to an efficient capital market, it provides more
complete information to be used in pricing the security in accordance with
the complete and actual financial condition and prospects of the company.
52
151. Id. at 17 ("The basic equations behind full-cost pricing are simple. For production,
whether industrial or agricultural, the full cost is the cost of production plus the cost of any
environmental damage associated with it."); Companies Begin Using "Green Accounting" to
Pin Down Environmental Costs, 4 BusImss AND TE ENvIRoNMENT 1, quoting Lenore Gold-
man, of Goldman Associates, Oakland, California, who suggests that full-cost pricing that
includes environmental costs should be expressed in a company's external financial statements,
as well as in their internal, managerial decisionmaking accounting papers:
"If you can integrate this information into your company's financial statements,
that's where it will have the power to impact the complete retooling of company
processes," Goldman noted. "An internal departmental version is a fine first step,
and an enormously useful management tool. It starts to move us towards a greater
goal, an accounting statement that evaluates performance based on sustainability [of
natural resources used in the economic development process]."
Yet, "green accounting" is not so easy to implement. The Business and the Environment
article quotes Daniel Rubenstein, a Canadian accountant who has worked on a "sustainable
accounting" project for the United Nations:
"Accounting for sustainable development sounds good on paper, but when you
really look at the application it gets murky .... A business enterprise would ideally
base its volume and capacity on the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. To discover
that carrying capacity, you get into science, which has an inherent ambiguity that
accountants hate. So you get fuzzy accounting-but an emerging approach says that
just because you don't have a precise cost, it doesn't mean you don't have a range
of costs. Internally, you need that cost information to make an informed decision,
whether or not you disclose it externally."
Id.
152. ROBERT A. HAUGEN, MODERN INvEsTMENT THEORY 634 (3d ed.1 1993), discussing the
efficient capital market hypothesis as it relates to the effect of disclosed, or "knowable,"
information on the pricing of securities, and noting the lively debate about the validity of the
hypothesis:
Prices are set by those marginal investors who actively trade in the stock. An
advocate of the notion that the stock market is relatively efficient would argue that
there exists an "army" of intelligent, well-informed security analysts, arbitragers,
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The overall effect here is a beneficial one: Investors are not defrauded
by being induced to purchase securities priced at a higher value than would
be assigned under circumstances of full environmental disclosure. Those
investors are also in a better position to make an informed decision regarding
whether to buy the securities (or hold, as the case may be). And, finally,
the reductions in the value of securities as a result of these market dynamics
may be so substantial that they create the larger, ultimate effect discussed
in this article: an economic disincentive to the issuers of those securities to
continue methods of production that generate large environmental liabilities.
Correspondingly, as to environmental obligations, such as legal requirements
to acquire and maintain certain pollution control technology, the issuer may
have an incentive to acquire-or develop-the most economical version of
that obligation.
3. The Potential of a Securities Regulatory Dynamic:
Specific Features of an Economic Incentive Approach
The SEC's current emphasis on environmental disclosure has generated
incentives for both environmental protection and securities market integrity.
The foundation of this phenomenon is the required transmission of impor-
tant information on environmental matters to securityholders and to the
markets about public companies. If adverse information relating to envi-
ronmental liabilities and obligations will have the effect of moving securities
prices down in efficient, developed public markets,'53 a company may have
and traders, who literally spend their lives hunting for securities which are mispriced
based on currently available information. These professionals are armed with com-
puters, and they subscribe to data-base management services which are tied into
their computers. They have at their fingertips up-to-date information on thousands
of companies, and they process this information using state-of-the-art analytical
techniques. These people can access, assimilate, and act on information very quickly.
In their intense search for mispriced securities, professional investors may police the
market so efficiently that they drive the prices of all issues to fully reflect all
information that is "knowable" about a company, its industry, or the general
economy.
Whether that is the case is a controversial issue....
Id.
153. The fact that environmental liabilities are often significant from a financial standpoint
and that access to information regarding such liabilities by the market would be through the
relatively costless, credible, and highly accessible medium of SEC disclosure, increases the
efficiency of the market mechanism that affects the price of the security. Also, to the extent
the stock is actively traded, traded on a major market system, or both, only adds to the
efficiency. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARvrN A. CRELsTiN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FNANCE 2-3 (1992 Teacher's Update) (summarizing the article by Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 49, at 622-26):
They suggest that the securities market has varying degrees of efficiency in reflecting
information in price, depending on differences in the cost of discovery and speed
of absorption of different kinds of information. They also relate those differences
to the operation of different identified market mechanisms-(1) universally informed
trading, most closely approximated with respect to old price information and big
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an incentive to ameliorate its environmental problems (or make its handling
of environmental concerns more efficient in the case of obligations) in order
to preserve the value of its securities as priced by those public markets.
Completing this dynamic are the "millions of decentralized decision makers"''1
4
participating in the public markets. Whether their investment objectives are
economic or social in nature, owners of securities are indeed key players in
creating incentives for adoption of more enlightened environmental policies
by public companies.
Of course, disclosure alerts the EPA, as well as public interest groups,
increasing the prospect of environmental litigation and, possibly, associated
liabilities. And in any event, the prices of securities in developed public
markets reflect the internalized costs of environmental damage to society
caused by the company in the course of production and in pursuit of profit.
One important question should be addressed on this topic, in order to
delineate the precise benefit of the dynamic being discussed: Of what use
is the securities law mechanism if command and control or other express
environmental regulatory systems already operate to implement environmen-
tal protection policies? One way in which the securities laws may have the
effect of promoting environmental protection over and above that required
by the environmental laws themselves is in forcing early disclosure of
environmental issues. In this regard, the ability to delay compliance and
the payment of fines and penalties through litigation or through adminis-
trative maneuvering is a major shortcoming of command and control
regulation.155 On the other hand, the essence of the securities laws is that
disclosure must take place early enough for the markets to absorb the
disclosed information and for the securityholders to be able to make
informed decisions with respect to the company. Failures of compliance
could lead to serious disruptions in business transactions or operations, as
well as early, stiff monetary penalities .56
news stories like presidential election results, (2) professionally informed trading, (3)
derivatively informed trading, which occurs when traders without information act in
response to the observed behavior of those with information, and (4) uninformed
trading.
Id.
154. PROJECT 88-RoUND Two, supra note 138, quoted in SCMDHEINEY, supra note 3,
at 25.
155. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 148, at 158:
Under a charge [economic incentive] system, a firm is almost certain to have to pay
the charge [for polluting], or spend money to abate in order to reduce its charge
payments. Under direct regulation [command and control], however, an industry
might conclude that because the enforcement mechanism is so cumbersome and
ineffective, it either will not have to pay for the most expensive kinds of abatement
techniques, or will be able to gain the monetary advantages of years of delay past
the official deadlines.
156. See, e.g., William R. McLucas, Stop Order Proceedings Under The Securities Act
of 1933: A Current Assessment, 40 Bus. LAw. 515 (1985) (discussing SEC authority, under
§§ 8(b) and 8(d) of the 1933 Act, to issue refusal orders and stop orders, in connection
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Hence, whether the subject of disclosure relates to (1) future required
capital expenditures for Clean Air Act pollution control under Regulation
S-K, Rule 101; (2) designation as a Superfund Potentially Responsible Party
in certain instances, in advance of litigation and judgment, under Regulation
S-K, Rule 103; (3) future financial implications of present environment-
related activities and trends under Regulation S-K, Rule 303 (MD&A); (4)
material environment-related information under Rule lOb-5; or (5) accrual
of an environmental liability under SEC and GAAP principles, the securities
laws often require advance disclosure. To the extent these disclosures are
material, they will affect security prices. And, when the cost of eliminating
the source of liability, or finding a cheaper means of meeting an obligation
(such as capital investment for pollution control), compares favorably to
the adverse consequences of disclosure, a company will likely change its
environmental behavior. This change or, perhaps more realistically, the
decision to change would occur prior to the required action by the environ-
mental regulatory regime (such as cleanup and abatement of the pollution
problem, or payment of costs or expenditures for obligations).
Another area in which the securities law mechanism may be useful,
above and beyond the force and effect of express environmental laws, is in
providing a lever for demanding environmental quality standards higher
than those required by environmental regulation. In this instance, the
disclosure aspect of securities law is not necessarily the most important one,
although disclosure may be useful in ascertaining a company's environmental
practices and in determining that it is only meeting minimum environmental
law requirements. More specifically, other features of security ownership
possess great potential for influencing environmental policies and practices.
with incomplete, inaccurate, or false and misleading registration statements). These powers
allow the Commission to act expeditiously to thwart the public sale of securities, often wreaking
havoc on a company's finances and reputation:
In a given case ... the Commission's issuance of a stop order may have a crippling
impact upon the issuer's subsequent attempts to sell securities, even if the issuer
amends the registration statement in accordance with the Commission's order and
the registration statement is subsequently declared effective.
Id. at 516.
... [S]ection 8(d) permits the institution of a stop order proceeding "at any time"
that it appears to the Commission that the registration statement includes "any
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."
Id. at 519.
Many disclosure provisions under the securities laws require an initial filing of the
disclosure document, followed by SEC staff review and approval, before a registrant can take
such important steps as selling securities, soliciting proxies, or proceeding with a tender offer
takover. In such instances, there is a particularly high probability of actual discovery of
disclosure violations. This, in turn, provides the basis for seeking expeditious injunctive relief.
Hence, if the disclosure is properly made and is correct, adverse information will be
conveyed to the market and will lower the price of the registrant's securities. On the other
hand, when disclosure is inadequate, SEC staff will refuse to allow the company to take the
action proposed, or will seek administrative or judicial relief. All of these possibilities are
likely to occur far in advance of any adverse action by environmental regulatory authorities
or private parties suing under a citizen suit provision of the environmental laws.
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These include advocacy through voting strategies or through various other
means, including the decision to sell or not to purchase the security, with
the aim of urging corporate adoption of certain environmental policies.
By way of example, the influence of environmentally sensitive share-
holders in the wake of the oil spill in Prince William Sound caused by the
Exxon corporation played a significant role in forcing various corporations
to adopt policies and practices (such as the Valdez Principles) that went
considerably beyond minimum requirements of the environmental laws.1 7
Given present trends, companies may increasingly have to respond favorably
to shareholder concerns and requests that environmental policies extend far
beyond the simple requirements of law.
58
Finally, as an over-arching theme reiterated throughout this Article, the
attitudes of securityholders about a company's environmental policies can
contribute greatly to the impact of the securities law dynamic as an economic
or market-based instrument. When those securityholders decide that high
environmental standards are important, then the leverage of securities reg-
ulation and related market dynamics as an instrument of economic incentive
over public companies is correspondingly greater.
B. The Potential Role of Shareholder Activism
As was observed in the previous discussion, the SEC is not the only
securities market actor capable of affecting the environmental compliance
records and policies of public companies by invoking the securities laws.3 9
In fact, securityholders of both the "economic"' 16  and the "ethical''6
persuasion have available to them a substantial array of disclosure and
other rights, which are often buttressed by express and implied private
157. ANNE SIMPSON, THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE ENVIRONMENT,
ETncs AND PoLrTcs ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES 114-16 (1991).
158. Id. at .129.
The emergence of socially responsible investment during the. 1980s may have come
as a surprise. The decade was characterised by the free market and financial
deregulation-ending with the defeat of socialist ideology in favour of Western
enterprise. Ironically, we may now be seeing a new form of social control from
within corporations as their performance is increasingly judged according to wider
economic, environmental and ethical criteria and not just profitability.
Id. (emphasis added).
159. The discussion in this section borrows substantially from a book by the author,
currently in progress, on corporate social responsiblity.
160. See, e.g., Levine v. NL Indus., 717 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d
199 (2d Cir. 1991) (economic investor sued company for failure to fully disclose environmental
liabilities for purpose of capital gains and dividends).
161. See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 661-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (seeking to end production and sale of
napalm by Dow Chemical Company for use in making incendiary bombs during Vietnam
War).
The two categories, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Yet, because the categories are
often identified with different philosophical or political beliefs-and thus, different views about
the objectives and operation of the corporation-it is useful to separate them.
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rights of action. 162 With these rights as a foundation, securityholders have
the power to achieve even more than requiring proper environmental dis-
closure: they can promote high levels of environmental compliance, should
they desire to do so, through the strategic use of securities laws and securities
market dynamics. Discussions of securityholder efforts to affect company
policies are usually carried on under the rubric of "shareholder activism."
Shareholder activism has for years been an important means of bringing
about changes in corporate management policies. Variously engendering
fear, respect, and even disdain in corporate boardrooms, this reform device
may come into play for the more traditional purpose of enhancing share-
holder wealth or for the more progressive purpose of advocating socially
conscious corporate action. Further, although the corporate governance
environment has been rendered immensely more complex by an emerging,
pervasive global economy and an increasingly assertive community of insti-
tutional investors, the possibilities for achieving responsive corporate action
may be even greater because of those same phenomena.
1. Origins of Shareholder Activism
The roots of shareholder activism are said to lie in the corporate America
of the 1930s, when a young Lewis Gilbert attended his first annual share-
holders' meeting. Appalled by the dearth of communication between share-
holders and management of the Consolidated Gas Company, he vowed to
"fight this silent dictatorship over other people's money."' 63
Thanks to the persistence of the Gilberts and others, corporate man-
agements became more accessible, provided greater financial disclosure, and
generally increased their regard for shareholders' roles in the corporate
governance process. This is not to say, however, that any permanent
quantum shift in shareholder powers and protections occurred; yet, com-
pared to past corporate attitudes and practices, the gains spurred by ad-
vocates like the Gilberts reflected considerable progress.
The second wave of shareholder activism occurred in the 1960s and
1970s, a period of social and political upheaval that centered on concerns
such as civil rights, the environment, the Vietnam War, and consumer
protection.' 64 Well-known projects such as the Saul Alinsky/Kodak matter,1
65
Campaign GM,166 and the anti-Vietnam War initiatives directed at the Dow
Chemical and Honeywell corporations 67 gave concrete form to theories that
were emerging regarding ways to influence corporate policies. These projects
were successful in generating positive action from corporations on the types
162. See generally Cox ET AL., supra note 48.
163. LAUREN TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER AcTIvIsM 2 (1983).
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 4-8.
166. Id. at 12-28; see also Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest:
Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MIcH. L. R-v. 419 (1971) (discussing campaign GM).
167. TALNER, supra note 163, at 8-11.
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of proposals that were to continue to appear in the future: changes in the
scope, nature, and procedures of business operations in the interests of
liberty, freedom, equal opportunity, environmental protection, and public
health and welfare; shareholder committees to serve as liasons between
management, the shareholders, and the public on critical issues; and mem-
bership on the corporation's board of directors of persons having particular
knowledge and sensitivity in areas that are the subject of advocacy. Fur-
thermore, subsequent initiatives, concerning such topics as discrimination,
nuclear power, environmental pollution, and divestment from South Africa,
built upon the basic formuli developed in the earlier projects.
2. The Role of the Institutional Investor
Institutional investors brought on the next important wave in shareholder
activism, eschewing for the first time-and with no small amount of
controversy-their traditional roles as passive shareholders. In the early
stages, the activist institutional investors were mostly universities, founda-
tions and church organizations, but gradually other organizations, including
pension funds, emerged to take a prominent place in the movement for
greater corporate managerial accountability.' 68 Motivating these changes was
a growing awareness by institutional investors that certain basic economic,
social, and political realities were beginning to frame, in vastly new ways,
their positions in, and the nature of their relations with, societies and related
institutions throughout the world.
So fundamentally different was the evolving institutional investors'
environment that the venerable old "Wall Street Rule"-under which an
investor who disagrees with a corporation's policies simply sells that com-
pany's stock-began to lose force. Instead, many institutional investors
charted a new course: maintaining their holdings and using the power of
their considerable share ownership to influence corporate policy.
3. The Size of Institutional Holdings
and the Rationale for Retention and Advocac3r
Institutional investors own immense amounts of corporate securities,
and this fact has much to do not only with why many of them have chosen
to become longer term security holders but also with why they are such a
major new force in corporate governance. For instance, today, the total
assets controlled by pension funds is over $2.5 trillion in equity and fixed-
income securities. 6 9 Institutional investors as a whole own 53% of the stock
market value of the top one hundred American corporations. Some of the
168. Id. at 34.
169. Peter F. Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution, HAgv. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 106, 106.
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best known examples are General Motors Corp. (82%), Mobil Corp. (74%),
Citicorp (70%), Amoco (86%), and Eli Lilly & Co. (71%).170
With the twenty largest pension funds owning about one-tenth of the
equity in America's publicly owned companies, and institutional investors
as a whole controlling nearly 40% of the country's large businesses, cor-
porate managers have noted with no small degree of anxiety that:
The largest and fastest growing [pension] funds, those of public
employees, are no longer content to be passive investors. Increas-
ingly, they demand a voice in the companies in which they invest-
for instance, a veto over board appointments, executive compen-
sation, and critical corporate charter provisions.
17 '
Yet if one looks only at the size of institutional holdings, one
may commit the classic mistake of confusing an ox for a bull.
Although public pension funds are "bulls" who often engage in
aggressive, outspoken criticism of corporate management, they con-
stitute only a modest minority of institutional investors. Most other
institutional investors seem closer to "oxen," because they have
shown little willingness to oppose corporate managements or even
to support dissidents in proxy contests. 72
This observation by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., while often ignored or
simply not known, is crucial information for any shareholder activist or-
ganization seeking to enlist institutional investors's support in its cause.
7 3
As noted earlier, fundamental realities account for the institutional
investor's decision to maintain its ownership in a corporation and become
active in its management ("voice") rather than observing the Wall Street
Rule ("exit").17 4 For example, the sheer size of institutional security holdings
in a given business creates, in and of itself, potential adverse effects that
usually dissuade these investors from simply exiting by selling large blocks
170. Carolyn K. Brancato, The Momentum of the Big Investor, DnRCTORS & BOARDS,
Winter 1990, at 38, 39; see also CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, TEE PIVOTAL ROLE OF INSrrurTONAL
IN ESTORS IN CAPITAL MARKETS: A SuMMARY OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT THE COLUMBIA
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT 19 (1990).
171. Drucker, supra note 169, at 106.
172. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Cor-
porate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1292-93 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
173. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, How INSTTuTIONS VOTED ON SOCIAL
POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1991 PROXY SEASON 9 (1991) (explaining differences
in support of social policy proposals at corporate meetings based on type of institutional
investor). For example, investment firms were the most "conservative .... Twelve of the 15
[surveyed] either voted against or abstained on almost every social policy proposal." Banks,
once uniformly likely to vote consistently with management, "continue to show more inde-
pendence." Public pension funds and educational institution were varied in their support for
such proposals. And, "[a]s usual, church respondents were the most likely to vote in support
of all social policy proposals, though they tended to vote against or abstain on the resolutions
relating to contributions for Planned Parenthood and abortion."
174. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FrMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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of their securities in that business. That is, the substantial price discounts
they would have to sustain upon such a sale, as a result of supply-and-
demand related price depression, creates a disincentive to sell. 75
Another reason offered for institutional abandonment of the exit option
is that "nearly one-third of all equity investments held by institutional funds
are 'indexed'-that is, they are invested in a portfolio of securities that is
intended to represent an accurate proxy for the stock market as a whole."' 176
The rationale driving such an investment strategy is that the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis works. 7 7 Having seen evidence of this theory's validity,
and thus believing that they cannot outperform the market (without taking
on unacceptable risks), many institutionals have staked out indexed buy-
and-hold strategies. The institutional investor has thus become, in many
instances, a long-term holder of securities.
7
Finally, joining size of holdings and efficiency of the capital markets
as reasons for institutional retention of corporate securities and advocacy
for corporate change are: concern over the erosion of shareholder rights;
and pressure from regulatory bodies, such as the United States Department
of Labor, who act pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) and contend that institutional fiduciary duties require
active participation in corporate affairs. 79 These considerations have pro-
pelled many institutional investors into the heart of the corporate governance
arena, thus introducing formidable new players.
4. Should Institutional Investors Use their Securities
Rights and their Market Power to Support Environmental
Protection? Can They Do So?
The fact that growing numbers of institutional investors are becoming
increasingly active does not mean they automatically favor investments or
advocate strategies that promote environmental protection. Indeed, certain
special constraints may constitute obstacles to such pursuits. Specifically,
more ambitious proposals, requiring substantial corporate expenditures, and
posing the spectre of low corporate profitability and low investor return,
175. Coffee, supra note 172, at 1288-89; Shareholder Activism; The End of the Casino
Society, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1991, at 60 [hereinafter Shareholder Activism].
176. Coffee, supra note 172, at 1339.
177. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 143, at 765.
178. See Coffee, supra note 172, at 1289 n.33, 1339.
179. Shareholder Activism, supra note 175, at 60; see also USA Meeting Highlights
Shareholder Activism, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1990, at 29, quoting United States Department of Labor
official David Ball on the obligation of pension fund managers to be active in corporate
governance:
[Fliduciaries of employee benefit plans have a duty to manage plan assets solely in
the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans; ... the ability to
vote proxies is a plan asset; .. . it would be a deriliction of duty if managers of
plan assets didn't vote or vote without paying close attention to the implications of
their vote for the ultimate value of the plan's holding.
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are generally more difficult for institutional investors to support-and they
are correspondingly more difficult for investee corporations to adopt:
The extent of institutional activism raises policy questions of
considerable importance to companies whose stock institutions own
and to the economy in general. There are also significant legal
questions: How does the prudent person rule apply to the voting
of shares by fiduciaries? Is the issue different from the question of
whether a ficuciary may invest based upon factors other than profit
considerations? To what extent does the prudent person rule, or
any other rule, require or permit a fiduciary to approve resolutions
that may have the effect of reducing profits? Is the problem resolved
by declaring that the proposal will increase profits "in the long
term?" What is the "long term?" ... Are all institutions-univer-
sities, foundations, public and private pension funds-treated alike?
... Should the fiduciary "pass through" the voting rights to the
beneficiaries?8 0
Managers and other fiduciaries of institutional investors are constrained and
guided in their use of institutional funds by various bodies of law, both
common law and statutory.' Perhaps the best known, and certainly the
most modem, legal regime governing such fiduciary behavior is ERISA,1
2
governing private welfare and pension funds."' Drawing from the common
180. LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL., CoRPos~noNs: LAw AND POLICY 570 (2d ed. 1988). See
generally BEvis LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE (1986).
181. DAVID L. RATNER, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 21-34 (1978).
182. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in various sections of 5, 18,
26, and 29 U.S.C.); see Hylton, supra note 32, at 37:
Prior to 1974, the year ERISA was enacted, the common law of trusts, the Taft-
Hartley Act, and portions of the Internal Revenue Code delineated the permisible
scope of trustee behavior with repect to pension investment decisions.
Id. (footnotes deleted); see also RATNER, supra note 181, at 33:
[ERISA] imposes broad requirements affecting many aspects of private welfare and
pension plans. The provisions of the Act are designed to reduce significantly the
number of people who pay money into private pension plans expecting to receive
retirement income, "only to have their hopes dashed and end up getting nothing."
The Act comprehensively regulates the activities of those who manage or control
welfare and pension funds by establishing federal fiduciary standards governing the
behavior of trustees and others who exercise authority over such plans. The new
fiduciary standards draw from the common law of trusts but modify the traditional
rules when necessary to implement the purpose of the Act. The law both expresses
these standards in general terms and enumerates specific prohibited transactions.
183. Although public pension funds and their fiduciaries-by far among the most activist
of shareholder activists-are not regulated by ERISA, it has often been observed that:
The fiduciary responsibilities set forth in ERISA are often used as the model for
public pension systems. ERISA case law may be analogized to [the laws governing
fiduciary duties in public pension fund investments].
Deborah J. Martin, The Public Piggy Bank Goes to Market: Public Pension Fund Investment
in Common Stock and Fund Trustees' Social Agenda, 29 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 39, 53 (1992).
Additionally, it should be noted that as to other types of activist institutional security-
holders, such as universities and the like, ERISA applies directly.
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law and other related pre-ERISA laws, Sections 404(a) and 406 of ERISA
essentially establish fiduciary duties in the nature of the duties of care
("prudent person" rule) and loyalty, and place those duties upon trustees,
investment managers, and investment advisors of pension funds.'84 But,
whatever law one considers, the fiduciary duty of prudence in handling
funds is still somewhat constrictive:
The promise of flexibility conveyed by the prudent man standard
has failed in application, due primarily to interpretations rendered
by judges and commentators more receptive to the legal principle
of stare decisis than to the evolving economic principles that in-
creasingly inform investment management.8 5
To be sure, ERISA has been construed to allow more flexibility than its
common-law antecedents.8 6 Nevertheless, as to socially responsible invest-
ments or any others, authoritative opinions have expressed that:
[E]conomic considerations are the only ones which can be taken
into account in determining which investments are consistent with
ERISA standards. Nevertheless, ERISA provides sufficient flexibility
to permit consideration of incidental features of investments which
are equal in economic terms.
8 7
While some disagree with this fairly restrictive view, 8 others with consid-
erable authority have supported this position. Ian Lanoff, Administrator of
the Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs in the Department of
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1106; Hylton, supra note 32, at 39; see also LONGSTRETH,
supra note 180, at 32-36; RATNER, supra note 181, at 33.
185. LONOSTRETH, supra note 180, at 152.
186. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983); Hylton, supra
note 32, at 39 n.173; Note, Fiduciary Standards And The Prudent Man Rule Under The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HAxv. L. Ray. 960, 768 (1975).
187. Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be
Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387, 392 (1980) (emphasis added). Ian D. Lanoff
was Administrator of the Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs in the U.S.
Department of Labor during the Carter Administration.
188. See, e.g., SEvERYN T. BRUYN, THE FIELD OF SociAL IwNvEsnM 9-10 (paperback ed.
1991) (citing and discussing Michael T. Leibig, Social Investments and the Law, S~rtuDs IN
PENSION FtmD INvsn msNTs, Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, Aug. 3,
1980). Social investing, absent self dealing, is defended by both authors based on ERISA's
acceptance of notions grounded in modem portfolio theory, and based on various cases
upholding decisions of trustees to make investments for socially beneficial purposes. See
Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding trustee decision to invest municipal pension funds in
speculative municipal securities as part of plan to assist city in time of severe financial crisis);
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1105-06 (D.D.C. 1971) (pension fund trustees,
dominated by coal union, held liable, based on self dealing, for depositing fund assets into
non-interest-bearing account in union-owned bank and for investing fund assets in public
utilities to urge utilities to purchase union-mined coal).
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Labor, expressed this view during the Carter Administration.
18 9 Whatever
one's interpretation of the scope of fiduciary prerogative here, in a quite
fundamental sense, any theory or rationale by which private pension funds-
or any other institutional investors-purport to invest or advocate in favor
of higher environmental standards at their investee corporations must be
competitively profitable with other similar investment opportunities. 190
What, then, will it take, in the larger sense, before institutional investors
begin directing their considerable resources and power in ways that promote
environmental protection? Stephan Schmidheiny, Chairman of the Business
Council for Sustainable Development, offers an insightful opinion:
Institutional investors must become increasingly aware of the envi-
ronmental risks and opportunities embedded in their investment
decisions. They have the legal fiduciary responsibility to exercise
prudence and due diligence ... If the message of sustainable
development can be transmitted convincingly to these institutions,
the cumulative effect could be enormous ... Given the right signals,
the institutions holding pension funds may find themselves attracted
naturally to the concept of sustainable development, as a long-term
view on future values and an emphasis on capital appreciation
corresponds to their basic nature and mission.19'
189. Hylton, supra note 32, at 42-43:
The reality is that if [socially responsible investing] is permitted under any circum-
stances, as it is, it may only be practiced without fear of liability when the screens,
whether positive or negative, have a de minimus effect on the performance of an
investment portfolio.
Id. at 43.
190. Various approaches have been offered to justify or attack socially responsible
environmental investing. Modern portfolio theory, in which the relationship of risk and expected
return is at the heart of the "efficient" portfolio investment decision by risk-averse investors,
is often seen as counseling against socially responsible investing. Id. at 14. Compared to
nonsociaIly responsible investment possibilities, the socially responsible ones must either have
(I) similar risk-return relationships, (2) higher expected returns for higher risks, or (3) lower
risks for lower expected returns, in order to be acceptable investment choices. Id. at 16-17;
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FiN. 77, 79 (1952).
Socially responsible investments are often criticized as being more risky, without providing
for correspondingly higher expected returns. The rationale generally offered for this conclusion
is that the process of selecting socially responsible investments necessarily may eliminate many
potential investment choices. Therefore, there is no opportunity to reduce some portion of the
overall risk through diversification of investments. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOmC ANAXYSIs
OF LAW 419-20 (3d ed. 1986). Diversification-basically, not "putting all one's eggs in one
basket"-is considered essential to the choice of an efficient portfolio. GiIsON & BLACK, supra
note 143, at 11-15.
Some commentators refer to recent evidence of cracks in the armour of the Capital
Pricing Asset Model-the high priest of the investment decisionmaking models-as a basis for
defending socially responsible investing. See Hylton, supra note 32, at 23-27. But, whatever
the theory or rationale, socially responsible investments must be basically profitable by some
reasonable measure. Id. at 49-52.
191. Scm srmY, supra note 3, at 64-65 (emphasis added).
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Essentially, Mr. Schmidheiny's message is that institutional investors will
respond most favorably to a direct and symbiotic nexus between a healthy
environment and "clean" or "green" company production processes, on
the one hand, and economic productivity and shareholder i wealth maximi-
zation, on the other hand. Creating and demonstrating the highest possible
level of this paradigm will have to be the work of those who would advocate
for ambitious corporate environmental protection policies.
The paradigm referred to above is the objective of the theory of
sustainable development, a concept currently gaining rapid acceptance. "To
be sure, exact definitions of sustainable development are still hard to come
by, but the essence of the concept is that economic and environmental
concerns cannot be treated separately.'" 92 Already, the concept has begun
to inform those seeking to resolve the conflicts that traditionally have
divided pro-trade and pro-environment forces at the international level.
Sustainable development is particularly important in debunking the classic
myth that an inverse relation always exists between economic productivity
and development, on the one hand, and environmental protection, on the
other:
If understood in the context of sustainable development, environ-
mental concerns and trade activities are not necessarily at odds, and
should be dealt with in an integrated fashion. It is clear that trade
policy which does not consider environmental impacts can under-
mine the natural resource base on which continued, or future,
development depends. At the same time, it is obvious that environ-
mental policy, framed without regard to development needs, can be
equally short-sighted. 193
Whether or not the concept of sustainable development will be a success in
reality remains to be seen. If it succeeds, then a crucial factual predicate
will have been established in support of economic incentives for environ-
mental protection. One may view efficient, effective environmental protec-
tion practices as a positive influence on company profitability and investor
return, rather than as a drain on earnings and a deterrent to investment.' 94
That is, if environmental policies and practices conserve resources and lower
costs, in addition to reducing the health threats of wastes, then institutional
192. Stewart Hudson, Trade, Environment, and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development,
in Ti GREENING OF WORLD TRADE 32 (Report of the Trade and Environment Committee of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency's National Advisory Council for Environ-
mental Policy and Technology 1993).
193. Id. at 33.
194. See, e.g., AT&T, A HEALTHY BALANcE: AT&T ENVIRONMENT AND SAX= REPORT
(1992) (copy on file with author). Environment & Safety Vice President David R. Chittick
reports that "[blecoming 'green' doesn't always cost; often it pays, in decreasing operational
costs and in avoiding future liabilities." Id. at 1. The report gives several examples of changes
in company production and pollution control processes that have improved productivity and
reduced pollution.
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(and other) investors wil view such policies and practices as desirable
features in potential investee companies. The economic incentive cycle would
then be complete. At a minimum, the concept has sparked lively debates
and discussions that will forever change the way the world views the cycle
of natural resource extraction through resource recovery. But the ultimate
success of the concept is crucial to the idea of economic incentives using
the securities market dynamic.
5. "Green Funds" and Public Interest Organizations
Increasingly, public interest organizations and investment companies
have used their knowledge of the securities laws and the stock market-and
their considerable financial resources available for investment, as well-to
affect the environmental policies of corporations. One prominent example
of successful advocacy in this vein is the widespread adoption within the
corporate community of the "Valdez Principles," ten principles generated
in the wake of the Valdez oil spill that "address the release of pollutants,
the sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of waste,
energy efficiency and conservation, and risk reduction to employees and
surrounding communities." ' 195
In fact, some of the best models of shareholder activism in the public
interest today come from the environmental movement. For example, the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) is a public
interest group made up of investors controlling $150 billion in pension and
mutual fund assets. Among Ceres's membership are the National Wildlife
Federation, the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, New York and
California state pension funds, and religious groups. 196 One would not have
difficulty imagining that CERES can get an audience with the managements
of corporations in which its members own securities.
The CERES example is only one of a burgeoning group of organized
efforts at using economic incentives to promote high quality environmental
policies and practices within the corporate community. Moreover, business
responsiveness to advocacy of this sort has grown rapidly within the last
fifteen years and promises to become much stronger in the future.1
97
Finally, various investment funds have emerged over the past two
decades, seeking public funds to invest in companies with purportedly high
quality environmental policies and practices. Accompanying this growth is
195. JoN C. HARRINGTON, INVESTING WITH YouR CONSCmNCE: How TO AcaIEV HIGH
REzuaNs Usn'G SocALLY RESPONSIBLE INVEsTING 227 (1992) (the principles "also address the
marketing of safe products and services, damage compensation, disclosure of potential hazards,
the inclusion of an environmental representative on corporate boards of directors, and annual
and independent corporate environmental audits.").
196. See Guy Halverson, The Greening of Annual Meetings, CmusTx N Sm. MoNrroR,
Mar. 26, 1991, at 7.
197. See HARRINGTON, supra note 195, at 225-47 (offering thorough description of
investment-related initiatives and favorable responses from the corporate community).
a
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a burgeoning body of literature on the subject.198 These funds, along with
the focused investment strategies of public interest organizations, could
eventually grow into an especially powerful incentive affecting the business
environmental policy landscape. Noteworthy here is the reasonable pre-
sumption that the individual beneficiaries of these funds have consented to
the inclusion of environmental quality as a leading feature of the funds'
investment portfolio decisionmaking calculus. In this sense, they will have
"ratified" the investment strategy, probably on the rationale that the
strategy is "economically sound because the consumption benefits of social
investing ... are, in economic analysis, as real as investment benefits."'' 9
This not only relieves, in some respects, some of the pressure to match or
surpass the performance of nonenvironmentally sensitive portfolios, but also
expands the legal protections of fund managers against actions for violations
of their fiduciary duties to beneficiaries.2
IV. CONCLUSION
The confluence of environmental regulation and securities regulation
has created a portentous phenomenon: the expansive, pervasive scope of
environmental regulation, combined with the recognition by securities re-
gulators and courts that environmental liabilities and obligations may be
material to investment decisionmaking and thus should be disclosed, has
created a powerful market dynamic that investors can use to promote
environmental protection.
The evolution of SEC policies regarding disclosure of environmental
issues, having gradually become more and more demanding, has by itself
provided strong economic incentives for publicly held companies to improve
their environmental policies and practices. Now, however, institutional inves-
tors, environmentally oriented investment funds, and public interest organ-
izations have joined the ranks of market actors, and they possess considerable
potential for affecting corporate environmental behavior. One can expect
that in the future, more and more of these organizations will realize the
great power of the securities markets to generate such incentives. The result
should be not only more accurately priced securities and more informed
decisionmaking by securityholders, but also perhaps considerable progress
toward a healthier environment at the hands of a new and powerful
economic vehicle for environmental protection.
198. See, e.g., BRUYN, supra note 188; HARiUNGTON, supra note 195; SISON, supra note
157.
199. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts,
79 MIcH. L. Rv. 72, 107 (1980).
200. Id. at 104-07; Hylton, supra note 32, at 48.
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